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ABSTRACT 
May courts consider campaign communications when screening for bad motives?  More specifically, if a government 
official embraced constitutionally problematic reasons for acting when that official was campaigning for office, may 
courts rely on that fact when asking whether illicit or suspect purposes animate that official’s post-election actions?  
The question recently arose during litigation concerning President Donald Trump’s “travel ban,” with different 
judges voicing different views on whether then-candidate Trump’s expressions of religious animus should factor into 
an analysis of the travel ban’s underlying purpose (and, by extension, its ultimate constitutionality).  Some of those 
judges argued that the statements should carry no weight precisely because they were uttered during a campaign, thus 
suggesting that campaign communications should be categorically excluded from motive-related inquiries.  This 
Article, by contrast, makes the case for an “inclusionary approach,” which would treat campaign communications 
as potentially useful evidence to be considered alongside other indicators of illicit motive.  This Article defends this 
approach as generally consistent with the role that motive analysis plays within constitutional law and as beneficial 
to the accurate judicial assessment of the government’s reasons for acting.  This Article also considers and 
acknowledges potential downsides to the approach, but it ultimately concludes that such downsides—though real—
are not sufficiently serious as to warrant a categorical rule of exclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The path to power often runs through a political campaign.  At the 
federal, state, and local levels, individuals wishing to acquire or retain office 
must frequently make their case to the voters, explaining why they deserve 
election to the position being sought.  Candidates devote significant resources 
towards these efforts—speechifying, rallying, interviewing, advertising, 
tweeting, and doing any number of other things to have their message heard.  
And through these efforts, candidates create public records of positions, 
promises, narratives, arguments, and rationales concerning their plans for 
exercising the power they seek.  Some elections are noisier than others—
county coroner competitions tend not to generate as much buzz as the 
quadrennial race for the U.S. Presidency—but they all involve the same basic 
dynamic: candidates campaign by transmitting information to voters about 
what they intend to do and why they intend to do it. 
Campaigns eventually conclude, but their records remain.  And those 
records might subsequently be of interest to constitutional claimants 
challenging actions that victorious candidates go on to pursue.  This is 
especially so when a challenge centers on the question of government motive—
i.e., the reason why a government official or institution has chosen to pursue 
the action under review.  Whether the relevant concern is discriminatory 
intent and the Equal Protection Clause,1 sectarian purposes and the religion 
clauses,2 protectionist objectives and the Dormant Commerce Clause,3 
 
 1 See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of racially 
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 2 See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the government acts with the 
ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause 
value of official religious neutrality . . . .”); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (noting, in reference to the Free Exercise Clause, that “if the object of a law 
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and 
it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest” 
(internal citation omitted) (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)). 
 3 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (“A court may find that a state 
law constitutes ‘economic protectionism’ on proof either of discriminatory effect or of 
discriminatory purpose.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
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punitive aims and the Ex Post Facto Clause,4 or other “suspect” motives 
under other constitutional provisions,5 reviewing courts regularly consider 
not just the substance and effects of challenged government action, but also 
the motivating factors underlying its implementation.6  And where the 
doctrine commands attention to the government’s reasons for acting, a past 
record of campaign communications might potentially shed light on what 
those reasons were. 
Let us now pause to acknowledge the elephant in the room: Litigants 
recently pointed to numerous statements of then-candidate Donald Trump 
in arguing that various iterations of now-President Trump’s travel ban 
 
617, 624 (1978); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977)); cf. 
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53 (highlighting the possibility of an “economic protection motive” in the 
course of striking down a law under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 4 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613–14 (1960) (“In determining whether legislation 
which bases a disqualification on the happening of certain past event imposes a punishment, the 
Court has sought to discern the objects on which the enactment in question was focused.”); see also 
Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1356–
57 (2008) (highlighting a variety of ways in which “[s]tate intentions are relevant to the 
constitutional law of punishment”).   
 5 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“A 
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose 
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus.” (emphasis added)); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that 
“[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration” when it comes to evaluating a law’s 
content-neutrality under the Free Speech Clause); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it 
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”).  For more detailed descriptive overviews of 
the myriad doctrinal contexts in which motives analysis plays a part, see, for example, Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 312–18 (1997); Dan T. 
Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch 
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1607 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden 
Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 537–53 (2016).  See also Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of 
Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1793 (2008) (noting that “modern courts stand ready to 
enforce a broad variety of purpose-based restrictions on legislative power by examining the 
available legislative history and even by taking testimony about the legislature’s deliberations”). 
 6 The pattern, to be sure, is by no means uniform.  Some of the Court’s decisions purport to disfavor 
reliance on government motive.  See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is 
a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”).  But see Elena Kagan, 
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 413, 414 (1996) (contending that “notwithstanding the Court’s protestations in O’Brien . . . 
First Amendment law . . . has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper 
governmental motives”).  And some of its doctrinal frameworks prohibit such inquiries altogether.  
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).  But cf. Cynthia Barmore, Authoritarian 
Pretext and the Fourth Amendment, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 295–98 (2016) (highlighting areas 
of Fourth Amendment doctrine in which “the Court has recognized that the purpose behind 
enforcement is relevant to the Fourth Amendment question”).  
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reflected an intentional effort to discriminate on the basis of religion.7  As a 
candidate, Trump frequently gave voice to anti-Muslim sentiments,8 
endorsing, among other things, a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out 
what is going on.”9  Some lower court judges pointed to such statements in 
support of the conclusion that both prior and current versions of travel ban—
though facially neutral with respect to religion—furthered the religiously 
discriminatory agenda that the Trump campaign openly embraced.10  But 
other judges paid the statements no heed, insisting that any motive-based 
inquiry must exclude campaign-related evidence from its purview.11  The 
travel-ban litigation thus presented one iteration of the question whether 
campaign communications ought to matter when it comes to gauging 
government motive: When asking whether the travel ban furthered a suspect 
or illicit government motive, should courts have been permitted to reach 
back into the record of Trump’s inflammatory campaign?12 
 
 7 The initial travel ban was promulgated just one week into the Trump presidency.  See Exec. Order 
No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).  But the President subsequently issued a revised 
travel-ban, Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017), in response to an adverse 
judicial holding from the Ninth Circuit.  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 
2017).  Multiple lower courts then preliminarily enjoined that ban as well, but the Supreme Court 
partially lifted the injunctions, thus allowing the second travel ban to expire by its own terms.  See 
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).  A third, and this time 
permanent, travel ban was thereupon issued.  Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 
45,161–62 (Sept. 24, 2017).  That ban, too, was preliminarily enjoined in the lower courts, State v. 
Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, No. 17–17168, 2017 WL 5343014 
(9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2017), but the Supreme Court subsequently stayed the preliminary injunction 
and eventually reversed the lower court judgment.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).  
 8 For a useful run-down of both pre-campaign and post-campaign remarks, see Jenna Johnson & 
Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, 
WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 
2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/ 
?utm_term=.e7b0a8ebadbb. 
 9 See Russ Kick, Trump’s Deleted “Preventing Muslim Immigration” Statement, MEMORY HOLE 2 (May 10, 
2017), http://thememoryhole2.org/blog/trump-muslim-immigration. 
 10 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1167; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 
554, 594–96 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project 
v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 585–87 (D. Md. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); Aziz v. 
Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 737 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
 11 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (characterizing an 
inclusionary approach to campaign communications as “folly” and a “path [that] is strewn with 
danger”); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 649 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing the inclusionary approach as “fraught with danger and impracticability” and 
“completely strange to judicial analysis”). 
 12 As readers well know, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs could not show a 
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their claim that the “travel ban” was 
unconstitutional, opting to disregarded the voluminous record (both pre-and post-campaign) of the 
religiously discriminatory reasoning that Trump and other advocates embraced.  Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. at 2423.  In so doing, however, the Court made no attempt to distinguish between 
campaign communications and subsequent communications uttered by Trump in his official 
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This Article develops a framework for thinking through both that specific 
question and the more general relationship between campaign 
communications and government motives across a range of different doctrinal 
contexts.13  In particular, the Article endorses what I call an “inclusionary 
 
capacity.  As the Court saw it, the travel-ban, as “a national security directive regulating the entry 
of aliens abroad,” was entitled to a highly (and perhaps even absolutely) deferential form of judicial 
review, under which all evidence of improper motive must yield to even the most tendentious set of 
post-hoc rationalizations.  Id. at 2418; see also id. at 2420–21 (“[B]ecause there is persuasive evidence 
that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from 
any religious hostility, we must accept that independent justification.”).  This was, in my view, an 
unpersuasive opinion with unsettling implications for future exercises of executive power.  But what 
is more relevant for our purposes here is simply that the opinion did not ultimately address the 
question with which this Article grapples: the Court did not say one way or the other whether 
campaign-based communications carried any probative value with respect to motives-based 
constitutional review.  Nor for that matter did the opinion render that question moot, given that 
there remain many other areas of doctrine in which the presence or absence of government motive 
still matters.   
 13 Most of the existing commentary on this issue stemmed from the travel ban litigation, which 
spawned a number of blog posts concerning the constitutional relevance of then-candidate Trump’s 
statements about his proposed “Muslim ban.”  See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, 
The Complexities of a “Motive” Analysis in Challenging President Trump’s Executive Order Regarding Entry to the 
United States, VERDICT: JUSTIA (Mar. 24, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/03/24/ 
complexities-motive-analysis-challenging-president-trumps-executive-order-regarding-entry-
united-states; Richard Hasen, Does the First Amendment Protect Trump’s Travel Ban?, SLATE (Mar. 20, 
2017, 9:28 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/03/ 
the_9th_circuit_s_alex_kozinski_defends_trump_s_travel_ban_on_first_amendment.html; Dawn 
Johnsen, Judicial Deference to President Trump, TAKE CARE (May 8, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/ 
blog/judicial-deference-to-president-trump; Heidi Kitrosser, Is Speech from the Campaign Trail Relevant 
to Religious Discrimination Claims?, ACSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/ 
should-elected-officials-be-held-accountable-in-court-for-campaign-speech [https://perma.cc/ 
DA3U-6KYG]; Eugene Kontorovich, The 9th Circuit’s Dangerous and Unprecedented Use of Campaign 
Statements to Block Presidential Policy, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/09/the-9th-circuits-
dangerous-and-unprecedented-use-of-campaign-statements-to-block-presidential-policy/;  
Matthew Segal, President Trump’s Campaign Promises Stick with Us—They Should Stick with Him, Too, 
JUST SECURITY (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39246/president-trumps-
campaign-promises-stick-us-they-stick-him; Ilya Somin, Thoughts on the Appellate Court Ruling Against 
Trump’s Immigration Order, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/02/10/thoughts-on-the-
appellate-court-ruling-against-trumps-refugee-order/?utm_term=.871065525996.   The question 
has thus far attracted only limited attention within the legal literature.  The issue has also received 
some treatment in several recent articles dealing with motives-based analysis more generally.  See, 
e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 547–60, 571–78 (2018); Aziz Z. Huq, 
Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 45–47) (on file 
with author); Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 39–41) (on file with author). 
The most comprehensive work on the subject to date of which I am aware comes from 
Professor Shawn Fields, who has offered a deeply informed analysis of the role that campaign 
communications should play for purposes of establishing “discriminatory intent” under the 
doctrinal principles under the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses.  Shawn E. Fields, Is It 
Bad Law to Believe a Politician? Campaign Speech and Discriminatory Intent, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 273–
74 (2018).  Although Professor Fields and I arrive at similar conclusions regarding the 
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approach” to campaign communications as an indicator of government 
motive, contending that judges ought not be stopped from considering the 
former when gauging the latter.  As applied to Trump and the travel ban, for 
instance, my prescribed approach would suggest that the evidentiary record 
should have included both those post-campaign statements about the ban that 
Trump made in his “official” capacity and any campaign-related statements 
that shed further light on the ban’s underlying purpose.  I further suggest, 
subject to certain caveats outlined below, that the same approach should 
apply across the many doctrinal areas in which government motives can affect 
a law’s constitutional validity.  To be clear, I make no specific claims about 
the weight that campaign communications ought to carry relative to post-
campaign statements and other “official” indicators of government motive, 
and I acknowledge the possibility that post-campaign changes of course might 
sometimes suffice to overcome any adverse motive-based inferences that pre-
election statements would on their own support.  But I do maintain that 
campaign statements should at least count for something when it comes to 
identifying the government’s reasons for acting. 
I develop the argument in three stages.  In Part I, I identify the reasons 
why motives might matter within constitutional doctrine.  Drawing on the 
voluminous prior literature on motives-based analysis in constitutional law, I 
suggest that “badly motivated” government action might qualify as 
constitutionally “worse” than innocently motivated government action 
because bad motivations: (1) create or contribute to “expressive” or 
“stigmatic” harms that are suffered by the public at large;14 (2) increase the 
likelihood that government actions will generate other sorts of 
constitutionally undesirable outcomes;15 (3) undermine the plausibility of any 
regulatory justifications the government has adduced on a law’s behalf;16 and 
(4) are themselves violative of a fixed and independent “rule” or “principle” 
 
appropriateness of the inclusionary approach, we do so through analyses that differ in both 
methodological focus and substantive scope.  In particular, whereas Professor Fields situates many 
of his claims within operative doctrinal principles of First and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, see, 
for example, id. at 315–24, my analysis operates a somewhat more abstract level.  As I explain 
further below, I am less interested in the question of whether campaign-cognizant motive review is 
currently permitted by operative Supreme Court doctrine as I am in the question of whether, as a 
theoretical matter, it ought to be so permitted.  Second, and relatedly, I attempt here to paint with a 
broader brush—considering the evidentiary value of campaign communications not just within the 
particularized doctrinal context presented by the travel ban litigation, but also across all doctrinal 
contexts in which a particular type of motive has been proscribed or disfavored.  In this respect, I 
believe the somewhat broader and more theoretical claims presented in this Article might usefully 
supplement the more targeted and doctrinally-grounded claims advanced in Professor Fields’s rich 
and illuminating work.  
 14 See infra Section I.A. 
 15 See infra Section I.B. 
 16 See infra Section I.C. 
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associated with a given constitutional norm.17  In developing this taxonomy, 
my aim is not to so much to defend the wide reach of motives-analysis within 
operative constitutional doctrine, but rather to sort through the different 
“types” of motives that courts might have good reason to care about.  
Specifically, I conclude that the first “expressivist” rationale for motives 
review favors an inquiry into the objectively apparent reasons for a law’s 
enactment, whereas both the “effects-based” and “justifications-based” 
rationales favor an inquiry into the subjectively embraced reasons for a law’s 
enactment.18  The final, “rule-based” rationale, I concede, opens the door to 
a hodge-podge of other more possibilities. 
Part II then turns to the relationship between government motives and 
statements from a campaign.  Specifically, this Part defends the evidentiary 
value of campaign communications, contesting in particular the claim that 
statements by a mere candidate for office are irrelevant to the motives 
underlying official governmental action.  I argue in particular that campaign 
communications can usefully inform inquiries into both apparent motive (by 
supporting inferences about the public’s own perceptions of a former 
candidate’s official actions),19 and actual motive (by offering a form of first-
person reporting as to the state of government official’s own values, opinions, 
and beliefs at an earlier point in time).20  I also consider and reject the thesis 
that—insofar as the doctrine centers on “official” as opposed to “unofficial” 
motives for government action—campaign communications are inherently 
off-limits.21  Such communications may qualify as “unofficial” in the sense 
that they do not themselves effectuate government policy, but that hardly 
prevents them from informing subsequent assessments of why official action 
was taken.  Thus, regardless of the “type” of motive being sought, campaign 
communications will often carry meaningful evidentiary significance. 
But arguments about evidentiary value do not alone establish the 
desirability of the inclusionary approach; we must further consider potential 
adverse consequences that might follow from its use.  Part III considers three 
such consequences: first, the inclusionary approach might chill candidates’ 
speech during a campaign;22 second, the inclusionary approach might 
preclude desirable (or even necessary) government action after a campaign;23 
 
 17 See infra Section I.D. 
 18 This is consistent with Richard Fallon’s observation that a “variety of subjective and objective 
conceptions of forbidden legislative intent make appearances in constitutional doctrine.”  Fallon, 
supra note 5, at 553; see also id. at 537–53 (charting different types of inquiries into legislative motive 
across different areas of doctrine).  
 19 See infra Section II.A. 
 20 See infra Section II.B. 
 21 See infra Section II.C. 
 22 See infra Section III.A. 
 23 See infra Section III.B. 
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and third, the inclusionary approach might frustrate judicial efforts to 
achieve simplicity and predictability within constitutional doctrine.24  These 
concerns are real, but they are in my view insufficiently compelling to 
warrant an absolute bar on campaign-cognizant motives review.  There 
remains, after all, the very real benefit to be gained from the inclusionary 
approach—namely, that of incorporating relevant information within the 
constitutional record—and that benefit will sometimes outweigh whatever 
adverse effects the inclusionary approach might yield.  The appropriate way 
to mitigate adverse consequences is for courts to keep those consequences in 
mind when implementing the inclusionary approach, not for courts 
reflexively to exclude even highly probative pieces of evidence for the simple 
reason that they materialized during a political campaign. 
That, in a nutshell, is the argument this Article sets forth.  But before 
moving forward, I should acknowledge two limitations in this Article’s 
methodological approach.25  First, this Article takes no position on the extent 
to which existing Supreme Court doctrine already accommodates the 
inclusionary approach.  My own view is that the Court has left the issue 
largely unsettled,26 although there are some pockets of doctrine that might 
seem to bear one way or the other on the question.27  Others may be 
interested in reading these tea leaves in an effort to predict the course that 
future doctrine might take.  My own concern, by contrast, is with what the 
doctrine ought to provide as a matter of sound constitutional law.  
The second methodological limitation is also straightforward: For 
purposes of this Article, I am bracketing the question of whether courts ought 
to care about government motives in the first place.  To be sure, in Part I of 
 
 24 See infra Section III.C. 
 25 There is a further methodological point that I might as well acknowledge here: Although I recognize 
that some commentators regard the labels of “purpose,” “intent,” and “motive” as capturing subtly 
different ideas, see, for example, Fallon, supra note 5, at 534–35, I do not believe that any of those 
distinctions make a difference for purposes of the analysis I offer.  Accordingly, and unless otherwise 
indicated, I use these terms interchangeably.  See Kagan, supra note 6, at 426 (adopting a similar 
approach). 
 26 But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438 n.3 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The 
Government urges us to disregard the President’s campaign statements.  But nothing in our 
precedent supports that blinkered approach.”). 
 27 For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court indicated that judges screening for sectarian 
purposes should not “turn a blind eye to the context in which [government] policy arose.”  554 
U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)).  But 
the Court also there said that judges should “take[ ] account of the traditional external signs that 
show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute or comparable official 
act.”  Id. at 866 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The Court also warned against 
“judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”  Id. at 862; see also Fields, supra note 13, at 
284 (noting, in the equal protection context, that “courts have largely limited their evaluation of 
the evidence to official governmental records and refused to consider ‘unofficial’ or ‘extra-official’ 
evidence of animus”). 
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this Article, I attempt to make some sense of motive-based constitutional 
rules, highlighting potential rationales and justifications for treating a law’s 
animating motives as relevant to its overall constitutionality.  But that 
analysis should not be mistaken for a comprehensive normative defense of 
motive analysis itself.  My claim, rather, is that to the extent that motives matter in 
constitutional law, campaign communications should matter as well.  I 
therefore do not grapple with the oft-cited threshold objections to motive-
based constitutional rules, such as the objection that it is practically difficult 
(if not conceptually impossible) to attribute motives to government entities,28 
or the objection that motive-based rules are futile in operation because they 
too easily allow the government to “remediate” or “cure” previously 
unconstitutional laws.29  These objections are important, and they may 
sometimes (if not always) provide a good enough reason for courts to ignore 
all potential indicators of government motive—including campaign 
communications—when implementing a given constitutional norm.  But 
where those objections do not prevail, and where government motives 
therefore become an object of constitutional inquiry, courts ought to consider 
campaign communications alongside any other indicators of what motivated 
the government to act.  Or so I will argue below. 
I.  WHY MIGHT MOTIVES MATTER? 
We begin with the question of why motives matter in constitutional law. 
What justifies the development of doctrinal frameworks that link the 
constitutionality of government action to the reasons for its implementation?  
We can state the question more precisely by considering governmental 
policies that are identical in substance but that appear to serve different 
governmental purposes.  Imagine, for instance, that one jurisdiction has 
enacted a Sunday closing law because it wishes to promote rest and leisure, 
whereas another jurisdiction has enacted a Sunday closing law because it 
wishes to promote attendance at church.  Similarly, imagine that two 
neighboring school districts have adopted equivalent school assignment 
schemes (with equivalent effects on the race-based composition of individual 
 
 28 See, e.g., J. Morris Clark, Legislation Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 953, 954 (1978) (noting that “[i]t is usually impossible to know the subjective motivation of 
legislators by direct evidence, such as legislative history, with enough certainty to declare a law 
unconstitutional as a result”); see also Fallon, supra note 5, at 531 (highlighting the “conceptual problem 
. . . involving the aggregation of the mental states of multiple officials into a collective intent of a 
decisionmaking body”).  The aggregation-based difficulty, of course, does not apply where the 
relevant government entity is a single government official.  See Shaw, supra note 13, at 37–39.  
 29 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (noting that “there is an element of futility” in 
motive-based review, because “[i]f the law is struck down for this [motive-based] reason . . . it would 
presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different 
reasons”). 
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schools), but that one district has done so for race-neutral reasons (for 
example, to minimize transportation and other costs) and that another 
district has done so for explicitly race-based reasons.  Or imagine that two 
states have imposed identical weight restrictions on the vehicles that may use 
its roads, but that one state has done so in response to deteriorating road 
conditions and that the other State has done so in an effort to channel 
business to local trucking firms.  In all these cases we want to know why the 
badly-motivated variant of each policy should qualify as more 
constitutionally suspect than its innocently-motivated counterpart.  If each 
set of policies purports to do the same thing, then what basis exists for 
concluding that the policies should meet different constitutional fates? 
In this Part, I posit four rationales for incorporating motives analysis into 
constitutional adjudication.  First, motives might matter because they 
influence the “social meaning” of the laws to which they attach.  On this 
message-based rationale for motive-based inquiry, courts should monitor for 
bad motives on the theory that badly-motivated laws can themselves 
“express” values and norms that conflict with core constitutional guarantees.  
Second, motives might matter because they furnish useful information about 
the likely consequences of the government’s actions.  On this effects-based 
rationale, courts should monitor for bad motives on the theory that badly-
motivated laws are, as a general matter, especially likely to impose salient 
constitutional harms on the public at large.  Third, motives might matter 
because they can undermine the government’s credibility when it comes to 
adducing an objectively adequate justification for a suspect law.  On this 
justification-based rationale, courts should monitor for bad motives on the 
theory that the bad motives can have a distorting effect on the government’s 
assessment of a law’s overall costs and benefits.  Finally, motives might matter 
because the bad motives themselves are constitutionally prohibited.  On this 
rules-based rationale for motive-based inquiry, courts should monitor for bad 
motives on the theory that badly-motivated laws, because they are badly-
motivated, violate a principle of independent constitutional significance. 
A.  Bad Motives Send Bad Messages 
Motives might matter because they influence the “message” 
communicated by a constitutionally challenged law.  As expressivist theorists 
have long recognized, laws exert influence not just by adjusting rights, duties, 
and powers among the parties that they regulate, but also by signifying the 
values, priorities, and beliefs of the communities that create them.30  In this 
way two laws might end up doing the same thing while “saying” different 
things.  One anti-leafleting ban, for instance, might signify a community’s 
 
 30 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of the Law: A General Restatement, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
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fondness for tidy sidewalks; another might signify a community’s hostility 
towards unpopular speakers.  Not every law need communicate a message, 
and not every such message will itself be easy to discern.31  But, just as it 
sometimes true that we “don’t need a weatherman to know which way the 
wind blows,”32 so too will it also be true that members of a political 
community can develop a reasonable sense as to what a given law is “all 
about.”33 
Courts might care about a law’s expressive significance for a variety of 
reasons.  Some laws’ messages might inflict harm on others; if a law expresses 
animus or hostility, the expression itself will heighten feelings of stigma, 
isolation, and fear within various segments of the political community.34  
Similarly, bad expressive messages might embolden and legitimate harmful 
forms of behavior by private parties,35 as might happen, for instance, when a 
government’s overt endorsement of racial or religious stereotypes causes 
private parties to embrace and act upon those same stereotypes.36  Further, 
the bad messages reflected by one law might conflict with the good messages 
reflected by another; problems can arise when one set of nonconstitutional 
enactments ends up signaling acceptance or approval of values that the 
Constitution itself condemns.37  In these various ways, the content of a law’s 
 
 31 See Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533, 1542 (2017) 
(noting that “different segments of the community may attach different meanings to state action 
depending on their own background”). 
 32 BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, in BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME (Columbia Records 1965). 
 33 Cf. Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contract, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 63, 76 (1994) (noting that “the need to attribute meaning to words or acts, and to differentiate 
according to the meaning attributed, occurs throughout the law”). 
 34 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 5, at 530 (noting that statutes might carry an “objective ‘expressive’ effect 
that stigmatizes a racial or religious minority or promotes religion to a greater than de minimis extent”).  
 35 Some laws, by contrast, might send positive messages that influence social behavior in a desirable 
manner.  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026 (1996) 
(hypothesizing that “an appropriately framed law may influence social norms and push them in the 
right direction”).  
 36 Charles Black alluded to this problem in his famous defense of Brown v. Board of Education.  As Black 
explained:  
[S]egregation is the pattern of law in communities where the extralegal patterns of 
discrimination against Negroes are the tightest, where Negroes are subjected to the strictest 
codes of “unwritten law” as to job opportunities, social intercourse, patterns of housing, 
going to the back door, being called by the first name, saying “Sir,” and all the rest of the 
whole sorry business.  Of course these things, in themselves, need not and usually do not 
involve “state action,” and hence the fourteenth amendment cannot apply to them.  But 
they can assist us in understanding the meaning and assessing the impact of state action.   
  Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 425 (1960).  
 37 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: 
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 507 (1993) (“Public 
policies can violate the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because 
the very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values.”); see 
also Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) 
(positing an expressive theory of equal protection under which “stigma or psychological injury is 
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expressive message might have some bearing on its overall constitutional 
appropriateness.  
That point has not been lost on the Court, whose members have 
sometimes embraced expressivist logic when deciding constitutional cases. In 
equal protection cases, the Court has noted that segregationist laws “denot[e] 
the inferiority” of racial minorities,38 that gender-discriminatory laws can 
“perpetuate . . . stereotyped view[s],”39 and that prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage can “ha[ve] the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are 
unequal in important respects.”40  Race-based gerrymandering can similarly 
“reinforce[ ]” and “perpetuat[e]” race-based stereotypes.41  In Establishment 
Clause cases, Justice O’Connor expressed similar concern about religion-
endorsing laws, worrying about their tendency to “send[ ] a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community.”42  In substantive due 
process cases, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas characterized a Texas anti-
sodomy law as “demean[ing] the[ ] existence” of the petitioners “by making 
their private sexual conduct a crime.”43 
We can elsewhere debate the extent to which (and the means by which) 
courts should consider expressive variables when deciding constitutional 
cases.44  The point here, however, is simply that once the expressive message 
of a law has assumed constitutional significance, then so too should the 
motives of the law’s enactors.  Message derives from motive: to discern what 
 
not a necessary component of an Equal Protection violation”).  In addition, Donald Regan has 
argued that overtly protectionist legislation is constitutionally problematic for the simple reason that 
its protectionist message is “antithetical to the very idea of federal union.”  Donald H. Regan, The 
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1091, 1126 (1986); see also Anderson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 1554 (citing to Regan while arguing 
that “protectionist legislation expresses a constitutionally impermissible attitude toward the interests 
of other States in the political union”). 
 38 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[E]very time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the 
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”). 
 39 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (noting that a Mississippi university’s 
policy of “excluding males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the 
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job”). 
 40 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
 41 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993). 
 42 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 43 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 44 For a dissenting viewpoint regarding the value of the expressivist project, see Matthew D. Adler, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2000) (criticizing 
expressivism on the ground that “[t]he connection between the linguistic meaning of a legal official’s 
action and what truly matters, morally speaking, about that action, is a purely contingent 
connection”).  
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a law “signifies” to the public at large, courts often need to know something 
about the reasons why the law came into being.45  Thus, for instance, if 
lawmakers enacted a facially neutral law for race-based reasons, that law is 
more likely to “express” a harmful race-based message than is an otherwise 
similar law that was intended to further a race-neutral objective.  So too for 
laws enacted for protectionist reasons, religion-promoting reasons, speech-
suppressing reasons, or any other set of reasons that might give cause for 
constitutional concern.  Motive, to be not sure, may not always bear on a 
law’s expressive significance; some enactments may simply “speak for 
themselves” in this regard.  And motive itself will not always be determinative 
or clarifying when it comes to defining the message that a law communicates.  
But, to the extent courts are interested in trying to figure out the “message” 
that a law communicates, motive-based analysis will often prove to be a 
valuable tool. 
But the motives made relevant by the “message-based” rationale are 
limited in one important respect.  Specifically, the rationale accords 
relevance only to the objectively apparent motives for a law’s enactment; it 
provides no good reason for caring about governmental motives kept hidden 
from public view.46  Expressive harms depend on the meaning that citizens 
attribute to government action, and that meaning—by definition—will 
depend entirely on the motive-based evidence that the public itself has seen.  
If government officials secretly favor a law because they believe it will 
subordinate atheists, while publicly explaining, defending, and promoting 
the law on nonsectarian grounds, it will be hard for a challenger to argue that 
the officials’ private motives themselves imposed a stigma on non-believers.47  
 
 45 To be clear, the claim here is not that bad motives are a necessary condition for the expression of a 
bad message.  In some circumstances, even a law passed for innocent reasons might nonetheless 
express a constitutionally problematic message.  Rather, the claim is simply that a motive-based 
inquiry will help to inform a court’s judgment as to what a law turns out to express.  See Hellman, 
supra note 37, at 59 (“[T]he assessment of expressive character takes the motives of those who enact 
the legislation . . . as only one data point in the analysis.”). 
 46 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 30, at 1525 (“The expressive meaning of a particular act or 
practice . . . need not be in the agent’s head, the recipient’s head, or even in the heads of the general 
public.  Expressive meanings are socially constructed.”); Fallon, supra note 5, at 549 (characterizing 
an expressivist conception of intent as “the communicative significance that a competent, informed 
participant in a society would attach to a statute as an indicator of prevailing societal values”); 
Rakoff, supra note 33, at 76 (suggesting that, on an objective re-formulation of the discriminatory 
intent requirement, “[w]e are not really that interested in whether our officials have good or bad 
souls,” but rather “in whether official action is demeaning of a minority”). 
 47 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (“If someone in the government hides 
religious motive so well that the objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the statute, cannot see it, then without something more the government does 
not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking religious sides.  A secret motive 
stirs up no strife and does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suffices to wait and see 
whether such government action turns out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the illegitimate 
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By the same token, if public officials privately favor a law for race-neutral 
reasons, while cynically using race-based rhetoric to drum up public support 
for the law, their private feelings of race-neutrality will do nothing to mitigate 
the law’s stigmatic effects.  If motives matter because of the public messages 
lawmakers generate, then the motive-based inquiry must confine itself to only 
those motives that the public believes to animate the law under review. 
B.  Bad Motives Yield Bad Outcomes 
We have already seen one way in which a law’s underlying purposes 
might influence its real-world impact: By shaping the social meaning of the 
laws to which they attach, bad government motives might contribute to 
expressivist harms that follow from public understandings of the message that 
it sends.  But there is another sense in which motives and effects interrelate: 
Badly motivated laws, on balance, are more likely to generate bad 
constitutional outcomes.48  Even if government motives do not themselves 
give rise to harm, the motives might nonetheless correlate with policies that 
yield adverse effects.  That correlation, even if imperfect, would provide 
courts with a further reason to consider the government’s reasons for acting.  
By asking whether a law derived from a permissible or impermissible 
governmental purpose, courts would be gauging—albeit indirectly—the 
law’s likelihood to alter the regulatory status quo in a constitutionally 
problematic way. 
This idea finds expression in Elena Kagan’s discussion of motive-based 
analysis within First Amendment law.  In a well-known law review article 
from 1996, then-Professor Kagan identified within free-speech doctrine a 
variety of different rules and tests that operated as “devices to detect the 
 
effect of advancing religion.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 48 One could, of course, characterize the message-based rationale as subsumed by the effects-based 
rationale, at least insofar as the message-based rationale highlights a type of bad outcome to which 
badly-motivated enactments can give rise.  But I believe that the categories are usefully 
distinguished, for two reasons.  First, as noted, the message-based rationale supports an inquiry into 
apparent government motives, whereas—as we will see below—a rationale premised on non-
expressivist outcomes supports an inquiry into actual motives.  See infra text accompanying notes 
73–77.  Second, the message-based rationale, unlike the outcome-based rationale, can itself be 
articulated in non-consequentialist terms; that is, one might worry about the “bad messages” sent 
by a badly-motivated law for reasons that have nothing to do those messages’ harmful effects.  See, 
e.g., Hellman, supra note 37, at 14 (advancing an expressivist claim that “explicitly denies that the 
wrong is rooted in consequentialist concerns); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate 
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 568 (2003) (contrasting a “consequentialist” account 
of expressive harm, which “looks at the communicative impact of a law or legal regime,” with a 
“revelatory” account, which “raises the problem of expressive harm . . . not by having some 
practical communicative impact on society, but by expressing, in the sense of evincing, the worldview 
of the state actor that made the law”). 
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presence of illicit motive.”49  One justification for the doctrine’s emphasis on 
motive, Kagan suggested, had to do with the correlation between bad 
motives and bad consequences: Courts might sensibly screen for illicit 
governmental purposes as a means of capturing those laws most likely to 
effectuate bad free-speech policy.  If, for instance, the aim of the First 
Amendment is to preserve “[a] state of public discourse . . . most illuminating 
to and desired by an ideally curious and engaged audience,”50 then courts 
should be especially hesitant to uphold any law whose underlying purpose is 
to suppress or punish the expression of certain ideas.  The problem with such 
a law lies not in the “censorial motive” itself; rather, it lies in the very real 
risk that the law will succeed at achieving its enactors’ aims:  As Kagan puts 
it, “[w]hen self-interest or ideological hostility enters into a restriction on 
speech, the odds increase that the resulting action will impoverish the sphere 
of public discourse.”51  Consequently, judicial efforts to eliminate badly-
motivated restrictions on speech might indirectly operate to “promote the set 
of outcomes that the audience-based model deems desirable.”52 
At first glance, as Kagan herself acknowledges, probing for problematic 
motives seems like a “strangely circuitous” way of probing for problematic 
effects.53  After all, if effects are what we care about, courts could simply 
evaluate those effects directly and on their own terms.54  Nonetheless, as 
Kagan notes, a direct inquiry into the nature of a law’s effects will sometimes 
prove infeasible or at least difficult to conduct, such that even an indirect, 
motive-oriented proxy for effects will sometimes prove useful.55  Regarding 
speech prohibitions and public discourse, for example, courts may “not 
possess a fully developed sense of what an optimal marketplace of ideas would 
look like,” and thus rely on effects-based standards that are “insufficiently 
definite and detailed to lend themselves to direct application.”56  Where this 
is so, the “focus on motive” can “provide[ ] an indirect way of identifying 
 
 49 Kagan, supra note 6, at 416; see also Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 931 (1978) (noting that a forbidden motive “undoubtedly is selected 
because of the social effects associated with it”); Ristroph, supra note 4, at 1385 (noting the view that 
“by basing legal liability on certain intentions, we can prevent or reduce the bad results associated 
with those intentions”); Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 191, 198 (2008) (“The everyday notion that people who aim at bad states of 
affairs are likely to bring them into existence goes a long way to justify concern with motives.”). 
 50 Kagan, supra note 6, at 507. 
 51 Id. at 507–08. 
 52 Id. at 508. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.; see also Young, supra note 49, at 238 (“Let us recall once more that while a consequentialist would 
prefer to go straight to an assessment of consequences by skipping reasons, this is not practically 
possible.  The particular consequences of an action may be impossible for a court to see, and even 
political branch actors cannot see the results comprehensively.”). 
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actions with untoward effects on public discourse.”57  
Kagan’s point applies directly to free speech review, but it is not difficult 
to see how a similar relationship might hold in other doctrinal contexts.  In 
Dormant Commerce Clause litigation, the presence or absence of 
protectionist motives may prove useful in determining whether a state 
regulation is likely to balkanize the interstate marketplace.  In the abortion 
context, lawmakers’ desire to erect “substantial obstacles” to pre-viability 
abortions may provide extra reason to worry about a law’s tendency to do 
just that.  And in other areas of the law, officials’ reasons for acting might 
bolster (if not wholly confirm) suspicions about the consequences of their 
actions.58  To be sure, sometimes those consequences will be sufficiently self-
evident as to obviate the need for any inquiry into motive at all.  But where 
there exists uncertainty about the scope and extent of a law’s outcomes, the 
government’s expressed desire to produce those outcomes should qualify as 
a reason to worry about those outcomes coming to pass. 
Suppose, then, that we choose to scrutinize government motive in an 
effort to better understand a law’s likely on-the-ground effects.  What sort of 
inquiry should we conduct?  Here, we should train our focus on actual rather 
than apparent motives.  We should strive to discern the true animating 
objectives of government officials, and we should not care whether those 
objectives were hidden away or widely disclosed.  In contrast to the 
messaging-based rationale for motive analysis, the effects-based rationale 
depends only on a factual inference that flows straight from the motives of 
lawmakers to the consequences of the laws they enact.  In other words, what 
matters on the effects-based rationale is the simple fact of the government’s 
commitment to a given regulatory purpose: it is that commitment—and not 
anything that government officials have said or done in relation to that 
commitment—that makes the bad outcomes more likely.  Consequently, if 
we are interested in drawing effects-based inferences from evidence of 
government motive, we will need to see evidence that identifies the true 
animating forces that motivated the government to act. 
 
 57 Kagan, supra note 6, at 509. 
 58 Ben Sachs has suggested, for instance, that motive-based inquiries might helpfully support effects 
based inferences within certain areas of labor preemption analysis.  See Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite 
Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1214 (2011) (“[B]y 
identifying, for example, legislation passed with improper motives (that is, passed because of the 
legislation’s effect of reordering organizing rules), it might be possible to smoke out legislation that 
has impermissible effects.” (citing Kagan, supra note 6, at 507–08)); see also id. at 1214 n.304 (“[E]ven 
if preemption analysis is concerned solely with a state action’s ‘effect on federal rights,’ motive 
analysis might be an approach to determine these effects.”). 
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C.  Bad Motives Reveal Bad Justifications 
The previous Section considered the relationship between bad motives 
and negative constitutional effects.  But motives might also figure into the 
equation by helping courts to evaluate the extent of any countervailing 
benefits that might help to justify those effects.  Call this the “justification-
based” rationale for motives analysis.  Courts often must determine whether 
a challenged law is sufficiently well-tailored to serve a sufficiently important 
regulatory objective, and they therefore must often decide whether to credit 
a government’s claim that a challenged law works well to serve an objectively 
valid regulatory need.59  A law enacted to achieve an illegitimate objective 
can obviously not be justified by reference to the illegitimate objective itself.  
But more than that, evidence of that bad motive may frustrate the 
government’s efforts to justify a law by reference to an altogether separate, 
and potentially more legitimate end.  As Professor Gordon Young has 
elsewhere put the point, “the presence of an illegitimate mental state 
animating an action might correlate at a usefully high level with the absence 
of any alternative and sufficient objective reason for such action, were courts 
to search extensively for such reasons.”60 
We can illustrate the idea with a hypothetical.  Suppose I have recently 
decided to cancel a late-semester class and that you have been asked to 
determine whether there exists a valid justification for my doing so.  Suppose 
further that you know the actual reason why I’m pursuing the cancelation—
I want to attend the opening day of “Jazz Fest” in New Orleans—and you 
are quite confident that this is a bad reason for canceling class.  Not 
contesting that conclusion in any way, I nevertheless posit an alternative 
justification for my decision.  Regardless of why I actually canceled class, I 
argue, the cancelation is a good and appropriate thing.  My students, I 
explain to you, have become mentally exhausted by the crushing workload, 
and a day off from class will afford them a much-needed opportunity to catch 
their collective breath before getting ready for exams.  Consequently, even 
though my decision to cancel class may have been badly motivated, it turns 
out that the cancelation will enhance the well-being of my students and—by 
extension—their performance on my exam.  And that happy outcome, I 
argue, should wholly suffice to validate my decision after the fact. 
Now, it may or may not be true that my decision would have this salutary 
effect (and it may or may not be true that this salutary effect would in any event 
suffice to justify the cancelation).  But put those issues to one side.  The central 
point here is that you should be highly skeptical of my representation to you 
that the effect is likely to occur.  My improper motives for canceling class have 
 
 59 See Michael Coenen, More Restrictive Alternatives, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (describing the 
mechanics of means/ends analysis). 
 60 Young, supra note 49, at 240. 
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rendered me an unreliable spokesperson for that position.  And that remains 
so even if you might normally defer to me on matters of student wellbeing and 
pedagogical need.  The problem is that my desire to attend Jazz Fest has likely 
distorted my own assessment of these issues, such that my arguments look less 
like the product of a dispassionate assessment of matters within my expertise 
and more like manufactured, post-hoc rationalizations for a decision that was 
already made.  In particular, you should worry that I am articulating not so 
much the end-product of a serious pedagogical inquiry as I am a preordained 
conclusion that my inquiry was reverse-engineered to produce.   
This hypothetical illustrates another reason why courts might care about 
government motive: Specifically, it suggests that the government’s past 
attachment to bad motives can have credibility-undermining effects on whatever 
justifications the government might invoke on a law’s behalf.  Judges lack the 
time, expertise, and institutional capacity necessary to examine from scratch 
the overall importance of a regulatory interest and/or the degree of a law’s 
means/ends fit.  As a result, they will often hesitate to question the 
government’s own representations as to the extent of the need and the degree 
of the fit.61  But even if such concerns might support a default posture of 
judicial deference to claims of regulatory need, so too might particularized 
concerns about government motive support an occasional override of the 
default.  More specifically, evidence of bad motives gives the court reason to 
worry about the government’s credibility as a communicator of high-quality 
justifications.  Having harbored invidious motives when it put the law into 
place, the government has forfeited its presumed credibility in invoking any 
other objective on the law’s behalf.62  The finding of bad motive, as Professor 
Young again puts it, “impeaches the trustworthiness of the political branches 
in a way that disqualifies them from making such judgments in the usual de 
facto final way.”63 
 
 61 Courts often admit to doing this, for instance, when the government defends its measures on 
grounds related to public safety or national security.  As the Court itself has acknowledged, “neither 
the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe 
new and serious threats to our Nation and its people,” and it is therefore “vital in this context not 
to substitute . . . our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative 
Branch.”  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 68 (1981)); see also id. at 33 (“Th[e] evaluation of the [national security-related] facts by the 
Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference.”). 
 62 Professor Ely alluded to this idea when he suggested that the Court’s identification of badly-
motivated action should “make it somewhat skeptical of claims of a subsequent change of heart.”  
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 138 (1980).  
Here, to be sure, the credibility-undermining effect of a demonstrably bad motive goes to a 
somewhat different question—namely, whether the government has eliminated its embrace of a 
suspect motive when attempting to re-enact a policy.  But the connection between past bad motives 
and present-day credibility is largely the same.   
 63 Young, supra note 49, at 240.  Paul Brest may have had a similar idea in mind when he set forth his 
 
Dec. 2018] CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS 351 
This observation might help to account for the Court’s practice of 
subjecting certain types of laws to heightened scrutiny—demanding, in 
effect, that the government satisfy a higher-than-normal justificatory burden 
when it discriminates on the basis of certain “suspect” classifications.  The 
Court has explained its willingness to strictly scrutinize laws that discriminate 
on the basis of race, alienage, and national origin by pointing out that “[such] 
factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy.”64  These types of classifications, the argument goes, 
are likely to reflect (or provoke) biased, prejudicial, or stereotype-driven 
modes of thinking.  Consequently, officials who formulate policies by 
reference to such classifications should receive a level of deference that is less 
than what they normally would receive.  To be sure, bad motives need not 
always accompany the use of suspect classifications; it is certainly possible to 
rely on race-based distinctions without embracing discriminatory animus.65  
Nevertheless, we might regard the risk of bad motives as high enough to 
warrant an across-the-board presumption to that effect—one that simply 
stipulates a connection between suspect classifications and improper 
regulatory aims.66  And with that stipulation in place, the need for heightened 
scrutiny becomes evident: The strong possibility that bad motives entered 
into the government’s decision-making calculus militates against reflexive 
deference to the government when it attempts to justify the law in court.67 
 
own approach to motive-based judicial review, although Brest’s account was not articulated in quite 
such explicitly consequentialist terms.  See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem 
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 116–17 (“In our governmental system 
. . . only the political decisionmaker—and not the judiciary—has general authority to assess the 
utility and fairness of a decision.  And, since the [badly-motivated] decisionmaker has (by 
hypothesis) assigned an incorrect value to a relevant factor, the party has been deprived of his only 
opportunity for a full, proper assessment.”). 
 64 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also id. at 440–41 
(justifying intermediate scrutiny for sex- and gender-based laws on the ground that “statutes 
distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded 
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women”). 
 65 The Court itself has suggested as much.  See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(upholding a race-conscious admissions program on the ground that it was narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest). 
 66 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 
26 (2002) (“The doctrine of suspect classification rests on a judgment that, whenever a classification 
of a certain sort is used, a court is justified in presuming that ‘a motivating factor in the decision’ 
was the illicit motive ordinarily associated with that classification in the minds of at least some of 
the citizenry.”). 
 67 The analytical relationship I have described here bears an uneasy relationship to the oft-cited 
suggestion that “strict scrutiny” and other forms of heightened means/ends analysis serve the 
purpose of smoking out improper motives.  See, e.g., ELY, supra note 62, at 145–48 (suggesting that 
“special scrutiny,” and in particular its demands for a close fit between classification and the 
asserted legislative goals “turns out to be a way of ‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation”); 
Kagan, supra note 6, at 414 (arguing that “First Amendment law . . . has as its primary, though 
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unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 
107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (noting that “[o]ne powerful function of strict scrutiny has always 
been that of ‘smoking out’ invidious purposes masquerading behind putatively legitimate public 
policy”); see also Coenen, supra note 59, at 47–51 (suggesting that courts might sometimes utilize 
means/ends analysis for the purposes of questioning the sincerity of the government’s commitment 
to a given regulatory objective).  But see Nelson, supra note 5, at 1843 (noting that “neither Justice 
Stone nor the rest of the Court seems to have understood heightened scrutiny as a way of detecting 
unconstitutional motivations,” and that “[a]s originally applied, the Carolene Products idea was more 
about effects than about purposes”); Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test 
and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 394–97 (2006) (suggesting that, within the context of 
First and Fourteenth Amendment review, the Justices initially conceptualized means/ends analysis 
as a “jurisprudence of cost-benefit analysis, not motive discovery”).  On this view of the inquiry, 
motive-based findings should operate as an output rather than an input of a court’s application of 
a means/ends test.  Thus, in contrast to my account here, which sees evidence of illicit intent as 
contributing to a finding that the government’s regulatory justifications are weak, the “motives as 
object” account sees a conclusion that the government’s regulatory justifications are weak as 
contributing to a finding that a law derived from illicit motives in the first place.  And the latter 
account raises an apparent difficulty with the logic of treating motive-based evidence as relevant to 
an assessment of regulatory justifications.  That is, if the whole point of a means/ends analysis is to 
reveal the existence of bad government motives, then my argument posits a circuitous and 
potentially even circular means of achieving this result: bad subjective motives point to weak 
objective justifications which in turn point back to bad subjective motives.  
 I concede that if the whole point of a means/ends test is to support a conclusion about bad 
motives, then direct evidence of bad motive might sometimes obviate the need to engage in any 
means/ends analysis at all.  At the same time, one can imagine scenarios in which motive-based 
inputs might usefully inform the Court’s application of a motive-centered means/ends test.  In 
particular, the Court might begin its application of the test with tentative (but not dispositive) 
evidence that a law derived from bad motives.  That evidence, though not sufficient in isolation to 
warrant an invalidation of the law, would at least suffice to justify reduced judicial deference to the 
government’s claim of regulatory need.  Withholding such deference, the Court might then discover 
that the challenged law is in fact severely over- and/or under-inclusive with respect to the regulatory 
interest on which the government’s justification relies.  Initial suspicions of bad motive would thus 
help to reveal the weakness of the government’s own justification, which would in turn function to 
confirm that those suspicions were in fact correct.  In that way, even if a conclusion about bad 
motives is the overarching goal of the inquiry, initial evidence of bad motive might usefully drive 
that inquiry forward.  The analytical relationship between motives and justifications need not 
proceed in exclusively one direction.  Inferences about motives and assessments of justifications 
might instead reinforce one another in an iterative, back-and-forth-type fashion. 
What is more, there are difficulties with characterizing the means/ends analysis as exclusively 
centered on the goal of smoking out bad motives.  For one thing, at least some forms of means/ends 
analysis quite explicitly leave open the possibility that a law might withstand constitutional scrutiny 
even if the government had bad reasons for enacting it.  This is most obviously true with respect to 
rational basis review.  See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (noting that, 
for purposes of rational-basis review, “[w]here . . . there are plausible reasons for Congress’[s] 
action, our inquiry is at an end,” and that “[i]t is, of course, ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this 
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.’”).  But the principle arguably holds in connection 
with some applications of heightened scrutiny as well.  See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 5, at 556  (“In a 
number of cases the Supreme Court has held that a finding of discriminatory or otherwise forbidden 
legislative intent will provoke strict judicial scrutiny but not necessarily require a statute’s 
invalidation, regardless of issues of but-for causation.”).  That approach makes sense if one 
conceptualizes means/ends analysis as a sort of “weighted balancing test,” whose ultimate object 
relates not to the presence or absence of bad motives, but rather to the question of whether a law’s 
regulatory benefits are significant enough to warrant tolerating its adverse constitutional effects.  
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Like the effects-based rationale, the justification-based rationale supports 
a particular type of motive-based inquiry—one that, once again, focuses on 
actual rather than apparent motives.  The relationship between bad motives 
and bad justifications stems from the trustworthiness of the government itself; 
the government’s motives matter because they diminish our willingness to 
accept at face value the government’s statements of regulatory need.  And that 
being so, it is the motives the government did in fact embrace—rather than 
motives it might have seemed to embrace—that courts ought to care about.  
If, for instance, government actors never seriously regarded a law as a 
necessary public-safety measure (while advertising it as such to the public at 
large), then courts would have no reason to trust any subsequent claims by the 
government that the law really does promote community safety in an 
important way.  Conversely, if government actors secretly regard a law as a 
necessary public-safety measure (while cynically drumming up support for it 
with appeals to prejudice and stereotype), then courts would have no reason 
to doubt the seriousness of the government’s safety-related concerns.  (To be 
clear, in this latter scenario, the bad apparent motives might still justify a 
decision to invalidate the law, but they would do so on grounds unrelated to 
the law’s effectiveness as a public safety measure.)  To the extent that courts 
consider governmental motives for the purpose of calibrating the level of 
deference to the government’s claim of regulatory need, they should therefore 
want to know what actually motivated the government to do what it did. 
D.  Bad Motives Are Bad Motives 
The discussion thus far has canvassed instrumentalist reasons for 
attending to the motives of government decision-makers, highlighting ways 
in which motive-based inquiries will help courts to achieve some broader 
constitutional goal.  Sometimes, however, this discussion may be largely 
beside the point.  That is, badly motivated government action might itself 
amount to a constitutional wrong, separate and apart from whatever 
“messages” it might send, whatever outcomes it might presage, and whatever 
justifications it might undercut.  Call this the “rule-based” rationale for 
motive-based inquiry.  On this account, courts must screen for bad motives 
for the simple reason that they violate a rule against bad motives. 
 
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1306–08 (2007) 
(developing this account); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 67, at 428 (acknowledging that within certain 
areas of doctrine, strict scrutiny has become “a cost-benefit test measuring whether a law that falls 
(according to the Court itself) squarely within the prohibition of the equal protection guarantee is 
justified by the specially important social gains that it will achieve”).  Obviously, on such a 
“weighted balancing” account of the means/ends test, there would be nothing redundant or 
circuitous about a court relying on motive-based inferences for purposes of demonstrating the 
weakness of a law’s underlying justification.  
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This might be true in one of two senses.  First, depending on one’s 
adjudicative methodology, certain sources of constitutional law—such as text, 
history, or structure68—may simply command attention to motives when 
certain types of cases arise.69  We could inquire into the reasons underlying 
that command, but the soundness of those reasons won’t have any bearing 
on the fact that the command must be followed.  If I am tasked with applying 
a constitutional rule that prohibits the wearing of green hats, the rule itself is 
all I need to tell me that red hat-wearing is legally out of bounds.  I can validly 
distinguish between green hat wearers and non-green hat wearers without 
ever developing a satisfactory account as to why the former are “worse” than 
the latter.  By the same token, some sources of constitutional law may simply 
compel the conclusion that some badly-motivated forms of governmental 
action are more problematic than innocently-motivated actions that are 
otherwise equivalent.  If so, that is all we need to know. 
Second, and more broadly, bad motives may offend some non-
consequentialist principle, norm, or value that we associate with a given 
constitutional provision.  Kagan has suggested, for instance, that any 
governmental effort to “limit speech based on its sense of which ideas have 
merit” would problematically “expropriate an authority not intended for it 
and negate a critical aspect of self-government.”70  Justice Harlan’s famous 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson articulated a similarly non-consequentialist 
rationale for a strict bar on race-based government action; such action, 
Harlan famously contended, offends the idea that “[o]ur Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”71 
 
 68 I am excluding precedent from this list because—unlike considerations mandated by text, history, 
and structure—considerations mandated by precedent are only as strong as the stare decisis norms 
that make the precedent binding.  Given the always-present possibility of overruling precedent, 
precedent-based considerations—unlike text-based, history-based, or structure-based mandates—
may require some level of extrinsic validation in order to retain their force.  The more arbitrary-
seeming the precedent, the greater the risk of abandonment by a subsequent court—even a court 
whose Justices are steadfastly committed to the common law method.  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (noting that a departure from stare decisis may be justified 
where “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine,” or where “facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, 
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”).  Contrastingly, if strong 
textual, historical, or structural evidence points to an arbitrary-seeming rule, the arbitrariness of the 
rule itself provides no reason for rejecting it on textual, historical, or structural grounds.  
 69 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(observing that “the secular purpose requirement [of the Lemon test] is squarely based in the text of 
the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce”).  Of course, the argument can work in the opposite 
direction as well, with courts citing to text-based, historical-based, and/or structural considerations 
as categorically foreclosing inquiry into governmental motive.  See, e.g., Hansen v. United States, 65 
Fed. Cl. 76, 81 (2005) (noting that “the plain meaning of the Takings Clause . . . contains no state 
of mind requirement”). 
 70 Kagan, supra note 6, at 513. 
 71 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 
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Surveying the landscape more generally, Richard Pildes has suggested that 
many constitutional norms require courts to “determin[e] whether 
government’s reasons for acting are consistent with the kind of reasons that 
make acts of political authority in a particular sphere legitimate.”72  In these 
and other ways, courts might condemn the government for relying on some 
inference that it has no business relying on or for pursuing some goal that it 
has no business pursuing.  And in so doing, courts would have no need to 
justify the prohibition of bad motives by reference to anything other than the 
badness of the motives themselves. 
In contrast to its message-based, results-based, and justification-based 
counterparts, the rule-based rationale for motives analysis does not identify 
a single “type” of motives analysis that courts must conduct.  Rather, on this 
rationale, the nature of the motive-based inquiry will depend on the 
particular rule or principle mandating the inquiry.  We are here positing not 
a single, universal mandate that flatly condemns all “badly”-motivated action 
across the board, but rather a collection of substance-specific mandates that 
mark out particular types of “bad” motives for particular reasons—reasons 
whose persuasiveness, moreover, will vary depending on the methodological 
and philosophical proclivities of the judge deciding the case.  That being so, 
there is no “one right manner” in which all rule-based inquiries into motive 
must proceed.  Some rules or principles may demand inquiry into apparent 
motives but not actual motives; other rules or principles may demand inquiry 
into actual motives but not apparent motives; and still other rules or 
principles may demand inquiry into combinations or variations of the two.  
The important point for now is simply that, unlike the other rationales we 
have considered, the rules-based rationale permits little in the way of 
generalized prescription and analysis.  If a court has inquired into motives 
because some rule requires it to do so, the adequacy of the court’s inquiry 
will depend on the particularities of the rule itself. 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1211 (2009) (characterizing Harlan’s argument as “invok[ing] the 
fundamental, non-instrumental norm of equal respect”). 
 72 Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 711, 714 (1994). 
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Having identified the various rationales for motive-based analysis in 
constitutional law, let us now turn to the specific question that this article 
poses: Should campaign communications inform courts’ assessment of government motives?  
Assuming that some area of doctrine has identified certain types of motives 
as suspect or altogether proscribed, we want to know whether courts may 
look to an official’s campaign communications when asking whether those 
motives exist.  The question, to repeat, is not whether motive-based analysis 
itself is a good idea.  Rather, it is whether motive-based analysis ought to 
proceed in a manner that accords no relevance to statements made in 
connection with an electoral campaign.  Can one justifiably contend that 
motives should matter but campaign communications should not? 
One might attempt to do so in two different ways.  The first justification 
would appeal to considerations of relevance and evidentiary value; in essence, this 
argument would contend that campaign communications tell us nothing useful 
about government motives and ought therefore to be shunned.  The second 
justification, by contrast, would appeal to considerations of regulatory effect; even 
if campaign communications might sometimes prove relevant, this argument 
would contend that intolerable results would follow from courts giving them 
evidentiary weight.  The next two Parts address each argument in turn.  
II.  THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS 
In the previous Part, I identified four different reasons why courts might 
care about motives when evaluating the constitutionality of government 
action.  I also suggested that these different rationales for motive analysis were 
likely to give rise to different forms of motives analysis, with the type of motive 
to be identified largely based on the reasons why a court cares about motives 
in the first place.  More specifically, I suggested that: (a) the messages-based 
rationale supports an inquiry into the publicly apparent reasons for a law’s 
enactment; (b) both the effects-based and justifications-based rationales 
support an inquiry into the subjectively embraced reasons for a law’s 
enactment; (c) and that the rules-based rationale leaves open a range of 
different possibilities.  
In assessing the evidentiary value of campaign communications, it will 
therefore be helpful to separate out the different types of motives for which 
courts might screen.  Taking that approach, this Part begins by considering 
the relationship between campaign communications and “apparent 
motives”—one as to which I think the most straightforward case for an 
evidentiary linkage can be made.  This Part then considers the relationship 
between campaign communications and “actual motives,” concluding that 
here too, despite some complications, campaign communications can 
provide useful information regarding the government’s “true” reasons for 
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acting.  Finally, this Part concludes by considering the various forms of 
motive analysis that might fall under the rubric of the rule-based account.  
Here, in particular, I acknowledge the possibility that the operative rule 
might define the proscribed motives in such a way as to render campaign 
communications wholly non-probative of the motive to be sought.  But I also 
suggest that any such definition would be difficult to derive and defend. 
A.  Apparent Motives 
If the basis for our examining government motives is expressivist in 
nature, then we should be interested in learning the publicly apparent 
reasons for the enactment of a law.73  Those reasons may or may not align 
with the actual motivating factors that prompted governmental officials to 
act.  But they remain relevant insofar as they help to shape the message that 
the law communicates to the political community writ large. 
Campaign communications might help to illustrate publicly apparent 
motives in two different ways.  First, and most obviously, candidates promote 
policies on the campaign trail, and in so doing, state reasons why they support 
those policies.74  Where those same candidates win elections and thereupon 
act to enshrine those policies in law, reasonable observers will fairly attribute 
those officials’ actions to whatever motivating reasons those officials cited on 
the campaign trail.  If Candidate A promotes Policy A on the ground that it 
alone will produce Result A, an outside observer will (or at last may well) 
assume that Candidate A’s subsequent implementation of Policy A is 
motivated by a desire to produce Result A.  The campaign itself will have 
created a public association between Policy A and desired Result A and that 
association will affect the reasonable observer’s subsequent understanding of 
the Policy itself. 
Second, and more broadly, candidates reveal to the world a set of values, 
opinions, and worldviews that may subsequently shape public perceptions of 
subsequent official actions.  Democratic strategist David Axelrod has 
observed that campaigns are “like an MRI for the soul—whoever you are, 
eventually people find out.”75  That may be overstating things a bit; 
 
 73 See Hellman, supra note 37, at 39 (noting that, within an expressivist framework, “[i]f objective 
meaning is determinative, evidence of subjective intent matters only so long as that evidence 
contributes to the public meaning of the action”); see also id. (“For example, private notes may be 
good direct evidence of subjective intent but are useless in determining what the law or policy 
expresses precisely because they are private.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Hillary’s Vision for America, OFF. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating the reasons for a 
number of different policies from Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign). 
 75 DAVID AXELROD, BELIEVER: MY FORTY YEARS IN POLITICS 462 (2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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politicians, after all, can cultivate and maintain public personas that differ 
from their true personalities, at least in certain respects.76  But whether or not 
it reflects a true representation of the candidate’s inner soul, the belief 
structure projected on the campaign trail is one that will likely inform public 
perceptions of the candidate’s subsequent actions.  If, for instance, Candidate 
A reveals herself to harbor racial prejudices, then members of the public will 
be more likely to find a racially discriminatory intent lurking behind 
ostensibly race-neutral policies that the Candidate later comes to put in 
place.  If Candidate A reveals herself to abhor a particular viewpoint or 
ideology, then members of the public will be more likely to find a viewpoint-
discriminatory motive lurking behind a law that suppresses the expression of 
that ideology.  This is all a simple reflection of the fact that (1) campaigns 
help to define the political identities of those who run for office and (2) those 
identities, once established, can inform public judgments about the values 
and beliefs that underlie official action. 
Two features of campaign communications, moreover, may actually 
render them especially probative of a law’s “social meaning.”  First, campaigns 
can be especially high-profile affairs; that is always true of presidential 
elections, but it often is true of statewide and local elections as well.  The 
distinctive visibility of campaigns suggests that statements made during them 
may more often and more effectively penetrate public consciousness than 
statements made during the course of run-of-the-mill governmental 
operations.  When laws get enacted and policies get implemented, members 
of the public may be more likely to view those laws and policies through the 
prism of the preceding political campaign rather than through the prism of 
legislative floor debates and administrative records.  To be sure, the 
relationship is not one-to-one; some campaign communications fly below the 
radar, and some “official” communications seize public attention. 
Nonetheless, it will often be the case that a statement’s status as a “campaign 
communication” may give us more rather than less reason to treat that 
statement as a valuable contributor to a law’s expressive message. 
Second, pre-election communications differ from post-election 
communications in the important sense that only the former constitute part 
of the public record against which voters make their decisions.  That being 
so, some campaign communications of an especially high-profile nature 
might appear to receive the tacit assent of the polity if and when a candidate 
wins office.  To the extent those communications connect up with a law that 
the winning candidate helps to put into place, the expressive harms generated 
by the law are amplified by the fact that the communications came before 
 
 76 See, e.g., DAN NIMMO & CHEVELLE NEWSOME, POLITICAL COMMENTATORS IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A BIO-CRITICAL SOURCEBOOK 4–5 (1997) (describing the efforts 
of Edward L. Bernays to recast President Calvin Coolidge as a “warm, sympathetic human being”). 
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rather than after constituents’ votes were cast.  Where public officials reveal 
bad motives after assuming office, observers can at least entertain the 
possibility that the bad motives reflect desires, values, and beliefs that most 
of their co-citizens would reject.  But that inference becomes weaker where 
those same desires, values, and beliefs constituted part of the informational 
backdrop against which the political community voted.  In this scenario, the 
bad motives are plausibly attributable not just to the candidate who made 
the motive-revealing communications, but also to the constituency that, 
having heard those communications, chose to elect the candidate in spite of 
(or, worse yet, because of) what the candidate said.  From the perspective of 
the individuals who bear the brunt of the bad message, the expressive “sting” 
becomes all the more severe.  
B.  Actual Motives 
Unlike the message-based rationale for motives analysis, the effects-based 
and justification-based rationales call for an inquiry into motives that are 
actual rather than apparent.  If a court knows what public officials actually 
want to achieve, then that same court becomes better positioned to evaluate 
both the positive and negative effects of their handiwork.  Where, for 
instance, courts uncover a subjective desire to cause some sort of 
constitutionally salient harm, they may plausibly infer that the harm is 
especially likely to occur.  And where courts uncover a disconnect between 
the motives underlying a law and the justifications said to support it, they 
may plausibly question the strength of the justifications themselves.  Thus, 
from the perspective of both these rationales, we are interested in knowing 
what actually motivated government officials to do what they did. 
In an ideal world, we could answer this question by entering the 
subjective consciousness of each official and recording what we find there.  
But this we cannot do.  Instead, we must gather extrinsic evidence and 
deduce as best we can what we suspect to be going on in the official’s mind.  
Past votes for past policies, for instance, may provide a clue as to why an 
official supports a present-day policy.77  Political affiliations and group 
memberships may be similarly informative; if a politician’s fellow travelers 
are known to support a policy for a particular reason, we might reasonably 
assume, at least as a default matter, that the politician herself supports the 
same policy for the same reason.  But among the most useful such sources 
available to us will be the subject’s own first-person reporting about what her 
own motives are.  Where a public official has openly acknowledged the 
influence of a given motivating factor, the acknowledgment itself provides a 
 
 77 See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (“The historical 
background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official 
actions taken for invidious purposes.”). 
360 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:2 
basis for thinking that the motivating factor really did influence the official in 
the way that she herself described.  To be sure, the subject might simply be 
lying or saying what she thinks her constituents want to hear.  But if we are 
trying to divine official motive, the official’s own statements about her own 
motives would at least seem to be a useful place to start.  And indeed, within 
a variety of different contexts courts frequently consider a subject’s own 
statements as indicative of what was going on in the subject’s own head.78 
The question then becomes whether campaign communications have 
anything useful to offer to this inquiry.  Are campaign communications so 
much less reliable than other sorts of communications that we should 
categorically exclude them from our evidentiary inquiry?  I see two potential 
grounds for making such a distinction, but neither strikes me as sufficiently 
persuasive to warrant a categorical, exclusionary approach. 
First, we might claim that a candidate’s statements about motive are 
unreliable because they lack a sufficient temporal connection to the legal actions 
we consider.79  Candidates often launch their campaigns years before their 
eventually assuming office, and they will thus begin talking about what they’re 
going to do well in advance of their actually doing it.  That can create a time 
lag between a candidate’s statements about policy and the actual 
implementation of policy—a time lag during which intervening events might 
alter a candidate’s mental state.  When a President speaks just prior to signing 
a bill (or a legislator speaks just prior to voting for that bill), we do not need to 
worry much about the possibility that the motive-revealing statements 
becoming an obsolete indicator of the bill’s underlying purpose.  But when 
the relevant statement comes from a long-ago campaign speech, we cannot 
be sure that the one-time-candidate still adheres to the beliefs and motivations 
that she expressed way back when she made her case to the voters. 
It is probably true that statements about motive lose their probative value 
as they fade into the past.  But a wholesale exclusionary approach to 
campaign communications would prove a clumsy means of confronting that 
reality.  Some campaign communications may be roughly contemporaneous 
with government action.  (Consider in particular the candidate running for 
re-election while continuing to conduct governmental business.)  And some 
non-campaign communications may be uttered well before the relevant 
 
 78 See Fallon, supra note 5, at 580 (noting that “[t]he remarks of a single legislator in legislative debate 
may provide only weak evidence of the intentions or purposes of other members, but very strong 
evidence regarding the speaker’s intent”); see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 (noting that 
“contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body” can be “highly relevant” to a 
determination of discriminatory intent). 
 79 I am not aware of this argument having been directly asserted in the case law.  But it is perhaps 
alluded to in some judges’ stated fears that campaign-cognizant review might lead to the review of 
an official’s statements that were made “from a previous campaign, or from a previous business 
conference, or from college.”  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th 
Cir.), vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
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government action takes place.  (Consider an inauguration speech about 
legislation that takes several years to pass.)  It may well be that campaign 
communications are more likely to present timeliness issues than are other 
indicators of government motive.  But the connection is no means ironclad, 
and temporal distance is in any event easy to measure on its own terms.  That 
being so, excluding all campaign statements from the evidentiary record 
would reflect both an over- and under-inclusive approach to dealing with to 
timeliness issues.  The better approach would simply treat timeliness itself as 
a factor that bears on a statement’s evidentiary weight.  
Second, campaign communications might prove especially unreliable 
due to the competitive nature of campaigning.  A candidate’s goal is to win 
more votes than his opponent, and much of what that candidate says and 
does during the campaign will be in the sole service of that goal.  Thus, when 
we consider what officials said during campaigns, we must acknowledge the 
complicated relationship between what those officials actually believed and 
what they believed the public wanted them to believe.  Call this the “mere 
puffery” objection: Campaign communications reveal very little of 
significance about the true aims and intentions of the candidates who make 
them.  The idea is captured in Judge Kozinski’s recent observation that “[n]o 
shortage of dark purpose can be found by sifting through the daily promises 
of a drowning candidate, when in truth the poor shlub’s only intention is to 
get elected.”80 
This is a stronger argument for excluding campaign statements from the 
evidentiary record, but it is not strong enough.  To begin, the argument 
seems to prove too much.  If we are concerned about pandering and puffery 
coming from candidates for office, we should also be concerned about 
pandering and puffery coming from officials in office—officials who still have 
incentives to get re-elected, acquire influence within the party, and curry 
favor with their constituents.  Politicians certainly play politics before getting 
elected, but they continue to do so after getting elected.  And that reality has 
not yet persuaded courts to treat all statements of government officials as 
categorically unreliable indicators of government motive.  Consequently, if 
courts are willing and able to separate out the sincerity from the puffery when 
 
 80 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Notice that 
the mere puffery objection is non-responsive to judicial efforts to discern objectively apparent 
motives, unless, that is, the politicians’ statements are so disingenuous as to appear as such to the 
voters themselves.  See Kitrosser, supra note 13 (noting that, from the perspective of an objective-intent 
inquiry, “[a] presidential action that is taken to appeal to a constituency’s perceived bigotry is no less 
discriminatory in purpose than is an action that manifests the president’s personal biases”); see also 
Huq, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that “it is passing odd to reject evidence on the ground that 
candidates should not be understood to mean what they say prior to an election: It might instead be 
more compatible with the democratic commitments of the Constitution to make precisely the 
opposite assumption as a way of taking seriously the electoral structures created in Articles I and II”). 
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it comes to post-campaign statements by elected officials, they should be 
willing and able to do the same when it comes to statements that are made 
during campaigns.81 
What is more, the puffery objection overlooks the role that campaign 
communications might have in shaping the subjective motives of public 
officials after the fact.82  Consider, for instance, the making of campaign 
promises: If Candidate A repeatedly assures voters that she will take measures 
designed to marginalize a religious group, then Candidate A—through the 
very act of offering that assurance—has created a political need for herself to 
deliver on the promise once in office.  In other words, even if Candidate A lacks 
a personal, subjective desire to discriminate on the basis of religion, 
Candidate A may well develop a subsequent, subjective desire to show her 
constituency that her campaigning amounted to more than just empty talk.  
The rhetoric may have been disingenuous at the moment it left a candidate’s 
mouth, but once the rhetoric was uttered, it created a reality in which the 
candidate needed to follow through on it.83  And, from the perspective of the 
results-based or justification-based rationale, that should be enough.  A 
statement of this sort may not evince a “subjective motive” in the sense of 
revealing what a candidate truly, deeply believes in that candidate’s heart of 
hearts.  But it still reveals a reason why a candidate may desire to put a policy 
into place—a reason that can in turn reinforce constitutional concerns about 
both the policy’s negative real-world effects and the pretextual nature of any 
justifications that the government has offered on the policy’s behalf.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 Cf.  Fields, supra note 13, at 300–01 (noting that the puffery objection “articulates a concern that is 
a matter of degrees rather than absolutes, of evidentiary weight rather than admissibility”). 
 82 See Hasen, supra note 13 (noting that “[c]andidates tend to keep their promises,” and that “[i]f voters 
can rely on discriminatory statements in deciding who to vote for, so should those who later 
challenge the discrimination that flows after the season of campaign promises”).  See generally JEFF 
FISHEL, PRESIDENTS & PROMISES: FROM CAMPAIGN PLEDGE TO PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE 
(1985) (providing evidence, based on a close study of presidential campaigns from 1960 through 
1980, that presidential candidates strive to keep their campaign-related promises). 
 83 To take a recent example, Paul Ryan recently cited Republicans’ repeated promise to “repeal and 
replace” the Affordable Care Act as a reason for their ongoing efforts to do the same after the 
election.  See Paul Ryan, Keeping Our Promise to Repeal ObamaCare, WALL ST. J. OP. (Mar. 22 2017, 
6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/keeping-our-promise-to-repeal-obamacare-
1490222397.  Ryan himself may well have had his own personal reasons for supporting the repeal, 
but other members of Congress likely supported the repeal precisely because of their prior promise 
to pursue it. 
 84 See Clarke, supra note 13, at 48. 
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C.  Other Motives 
On the rules-based rationale for motives analysis, bad motives matter 
because they violate some “rule” or “principle” that binds a reviewing court.  
That rule/principle might derive from considerations of constitutional text, 
history, or structure, or from a more philosophically-oriented account of the 
values underlying the relevant constitutional provision.  But regardless of the 
source or content of the rule being applied, the critical, shared feature of 
these arguments is their ability to justify the invalidation of badly-motivated 
action by reference to the rule standing on its own.  A motive counts as bad 
simply because the rule says it is bad. 
On a rule-based approach to motive analysis, the probative value of 
campaign communications will depend on the particular rule being applied.  
If, for instance, a rule directs attention to the objectively apparent motives 
underlying government action, then—for reasons we have already 
identified—campaign communications should carry some evidentiary value.  
The same point holds for the application of rules that call for an inquiry into 
the actual, subjective motives underlying government action: Here too, as we 
have already suggested, campaign communications can usefully inform the 
motive-based inquiry.  But a governing rule might also define the disfavored 
motive in more contingent or particularized terms, in which case campaign 
communications may not have an evidentiary role to play. 
I cannot rule out this possibility: It is possible as a conceptual matter to 
formulate a rule that defines proscribed motives in a manner that renders 
campaign communications irrelevant to the inquiry.  Consider, for example, 
a rule that declares: “The Equal Protection Clause requires courts to strictly 
scrutinize legislation motivated by a racially discriminatory intent, but only 
insofar as that intent is manifested in formal legislative proceedings.”  I am 
not aware of any existing doctrinal rules that work this way, but perhaps such 
a rule would follow from some as-yet undiscovered nugget of constitutional 
history, some as-yet unnoticed pattern within the constitutional text, some 
as-yet unembraced philosophical insight regarding the wrongfulness of 
discriminatory action, or some other development we cannot now foresee.  
And if it did, there would arise along with it ipso facto reason for ignoring 
campaign communications while assessing government motive. 
Having said that, I do want to consider one potential “rule-based” 
argument that might have the effect of rendering campaign communications 
irrelevant to a wide range of motive-based inquiries.  The argument—which 
surfaced at points during the travel ban litigation85—would go something like 
 
 85 Brief for Appellants at 50, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. Mar. 
24, 2017) (No. 17-1351) (“The problem with campaign statements is not that they may be forgotten, 
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this: The Constitution, concerned as it is with state action, has nothing to say 
about what governmental officials may or may not do in their unofficial 
capacities.86  Thus, the argument goes, insofar as courts screen for badly-
motivated action, this basic structural feature of constitutional law requires 
that the inquiry extend no further than the “official motives” of government 
actors.  The argument would thus posit a key distinction between official and 
unofficial conduct, and it would derive from that distinction the rule that only 
“officially” proclaimed motives should bear on a law’s constitutionality.  
Given that public officials make campaign statements in their unofficial 
capacity, such statements would, by definition, fail to shed light on the 
government’s official reasons for acting.87 
The trouble with this argument lies not in the structural principle it 
posits—certainly, one can contend that the Constitution applies to only the 
“official” actions of governmental agents and entities.  Rather, the trouble 
lies in its conflation of substantive postulates about what the Constitution 
prohibits with evidentiary postulates about how prohibited conduct may be 
shown.  The “state action” principle gives us good reason to reject 
constitutional challenges predicated on actions that candidates took with 
respect to their own “unofficial” campaigns.  (Troubling as it may have been 
for Donald Trump to exclude certain media outlets from his campaign 
rallies,88 the state-action requirement would likely defeat any claim that the 
 
but that they do not prove anything about the official objective underlying subsequent action.”); see 
also Kontorovich, supra note 13 (“More broadly, constitutional structure supports examining only 
executive statements to interpret executive action.  When Trump made his most controversial 
statements, he was [a] private citizen.  He had not sworn to uphold the Constitution, or to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.  He was, in this sense, a legally differently obligated person.”).  
The Court itself has used the phrase “official objective,” but in context, its use of the term seems to 
align more closely with the idea of an authoritative finding of motive rather than a motive that derives 
from official government proclamations.  See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862–63 (2005). 
 86 The notable exception, of course, is the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 87 A related argument, advanced in the context of the travel-ban litigation, holds that the Oath of 
Office, combined with the Article II duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” renders 
pre-inauguration statements inherently irrelevant to the motives underlying post-inauguration 
actions.  See, e.g., Kontorivch, supra note 13.  But this argument would seem to prove too much: if 
the Oath and take-care duty were as transformative as the argument posits them to be, then courts 
would have no reason to question the legality of anything an oath-taking President does.  But, of 
course, courts routinely entertain the possibility that a President might violate the Oath by acting 
unlawfully; and if that is the relevant question, there is no immediately apparent reason why the 
Oath itself requires confining the evidentiary record to statements made after the Oath’s 
administration.  It seems strange to concede, on the one hand, that the Oath does not guarantee 
the lawfulness of all presidential action, while insisting at the same time that the oath wipes away 
all the bad motives that a new President might have harbored in the not-too-distant past.  
 88 See Hadas Gold, Trump Campaign Ends Media Blacklist, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2016, 10:01 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/09/trump-campaign-ends-media-blacklist-
227827 (noting that “[t]he blacklist ha[d] been in effect at the Trump campaign for nearly a year”). 
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exclusion violated the First Amendment.89)  But it hardly follows that, once 
the state has acted, courts must ignore unofficial statements when 
investigating the reasons why the official action itself occurred.  Just because 
I am acting in my unofficial capacity does not mean that I am unable to 
propose, describe, explain, and/or justify things I plan to do in my official 
capacity; indeed, candidates for public office spend much of their time doing 
just that.  And when I subsequently do the things I previously described, my 
earlier (unofficial) statements remain relevant to the question of why I chose 
to do what I (officially) did.  Citing to “unofficial” statements in this sort of 
way is no more controversial from a state-action perspective than, say, citing 
to an “unofficial” academic study for purposes of bolstering a conclusion 
about a law’s regulatory effects, citing to “unofficial” testimony for purposes 
of illustrating the existence of a regulatory need, or even citing to an 
“unofficial” law review article for purposes of supporting a legal claim of 
relevance to a case under review.  Just because the evidence itself comes from 
an “unofficial” source in no way undermines its ability to shed light on the 
legality of what was officially done.  
III.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCLUSION 
Even if campaign communications have evidentiary value, courts might 
still worry about the regulatory consequences of the inclusionary approach.  
The law of evidence is replete with rules that require the exclusion of 
potentially probative information, and many of these rules are justified by 
reference to concerns about the regulatory effects of letting that information 
in.  Various common law “privileges” make sense along these lines—a 
client’s communication with her attorney may be decisively probative of a 
key factual question, but revealing that communication to a jury would 
undermine the relationship of trust between attorneys and clients.90  Public 
law rules of “executive privilege” have been justified along similar lines.91  
And, of course, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is often defended 
as necessary as to achieve the consequence of deterring unlawful government 
 
 89 See Colleen Shalby, Has Trump Violated the 1st Amendment? Not Yet, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-reporter-ban-first-amendment-20160714-snap-
htmlstory.html (quoting Prof. Michael Shapiro as noting that “[c]andidates are not subject to the 1st 
Amendment even though their candidacies are part of the fabric of government” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 90 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that “the purpose of [attorney-
client] privilege” is “‘to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys’” (quoting Fisher 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976))). 
 91 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those who 
expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for 
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”). 
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behavior, even where the excluded evidence might help to demonstrate that 
a defendant committed a crime.92 
A similar argument might justify the exclusion of campaign 
communications from motive-related inquiries.  In this Part, I consider three 
types of consequences about which opponents of the inclusionary approach 
might worry.  First are campaign-related consequences; more specifically, the 
inclusionary approach might function to “chill” candidates’ communications 
on the campaign trail.  Second are governing-related consequences; more 
specifically, the inclusionary approach might render valuable policies 
vulnerable to invalidation on motive-related grounds.  Finally, there are court-
related consequences; more specifically, the inclusionary approach might give 
judges too much room to engage in manipulative and unpredictable 
decision-making. 
A.  Effects on Campaigning 
Let’s begin with the most straightforward consequentialist objection to 
the use of campaign communications as evidence of bad motives.  If 
candidates’ statements can affect the constitutionality of their subsequent 
actions, then candidates will become more cautious about what they say 
when they campaign.  Rather than openly broadcast controversial policies 
and ideas, candidates will simply hide the ball—disingenuously pretending 
to support policies for reasons that they don’t actually believe, or not saying 
anything about those policies at all.  The result is a less robust political 
dialogue and deprived information base for voters to consult when making 
their electoral choices.  Indeed, such chilling effects may even carry the 
undesirable result of rendering voters’ democratic choices less responsive to 
the true aims and intentions of candidates for public office.93 
An initial difficulty with this argument lies in its prediction that 
campaign-cognizant motives analysis would in fact have a substantial effect 
on what is said and done on the campaign trail.  At the margin, perhaps, a 
candidate who is otherwise indifferent to the prospect of broadcasting bad 
motives may regard hypothetical litigation difficulties as a decisive reason to 
keep those motives bottled up.  But a candidate’s top priority is usually to win 
 
 92 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (characterizing the exclusionary rule as  “a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its 
deterrent effect”). 
 93 For general versions of this critique, see, for example, Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (declining to consider an elected prosecutor’s previous campaign statements on the 
ground that doing so would “chill political debate during campaigns for prosecutor”).  See also Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th Cir. 2017) (Neimeyer, J., dissenting); 
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Kontorovich, 
supra note 13. 
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the election,94 and that present-day imperative will typically take precedence 
over the highly secondary priority of avoiding future complications in court.95  
This seems especially true with respect to candidates for the legislature and 
other multi-member institutions, who might regard their own statements as 
unlikely to be decisive in a court’s assessment of the institution’s own reasons 
for acting.  If a candidate sees political value in making some statement, then 
the down-the-road prospect of litigation difficulties is unlikely to make the 
candidate change course.96  Rather, the candidate will opt for the immediate 
electoral gain and figure out sometime later how to deal with eventual 
constitutional difficulties if and when they arise.  This is, to be clear, just a 
supposition, and perhaps empirical data would prove it wrong.  But my 
intuition is that the openness and robustness of political campaigns will not 
much change if courts were to openly adopt the inclusionary approach. 
But suppose that I am wrong and that an inclusionary approach would 
in fact meaningfully deter political candidates from saying things that might 
one day be used to support an inference of improper motives.  Does that fact 
alone provide a sufficient reason to reject it?  Certainly, the chilling effects 
argument is correct to posit a “cost” in the way of First Amendment free-
speech values;97 if the only relevant goal is to foster a truly unfettered, no-
holds-barred political campaign, then any deterrent on campaign-related 
communications would provide definitive cause for concern.  But the Free 
Speech Clause does not exhaust the entire range of constitutional values at 
play, and tradeoffs start to come into view when these other values are 
 
 94 The “chilling effects” objection in this sense stands in some tension with the “mere puffery” argument 
we earlier considered.  See supra Section II.B.  That argument, recall, posited that campaign 
communications are useless indicators of future government action, reflecting instead meaningless 
efforts at pandering.  But if such motive-revealing statements constitute meaningless puffery, the First 
Amendment case for preserving those statements becomes correspondingly less strong. 
 95 The degree of the candidate’s relative apathy towards future litigation may be amplified by the well-
documented behavioral tendency to discount future costs.  See, e.g., David A. Dana, A Behavioral 
Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324–27 (2003) (noting that “[a] 
substantial experimental literature suggests that people value the avoidance of immediate or nearly 
immediate losses far more strongly than the avoidance of losses even in the not-too-distant future”). 
 96 See Clarke, supra note 13,  at 69 (noting that politicians who “rise to prominence by eschewing 
‘political correctness’ and making overtly racist and sexist campaign promises” are “unlikely to be 
deterred by the prospect of litigation”). 
 97 To be clear, in raising this possibility, I do not mean to suggest that campaign-cognizant motives 
review might violate the First Amendment itself.  That possibility strikes me as unlikely, given the 
absence of any sort of “official sanction” or “punishment” that the inclusionary approach entails.  
See Kitrosser, supra note 13 (noting that “[w]eighing such [campaign] statements as evidence . . . is 
not the same thing as punishing candidates for the statements themselves”); see also Michael Coenen, 
Of Speech and Sanctions: Towards a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
991, 994, 1018–19 (2012) (considering the relationship between penalty severity and the scope of 
the free speech right).  But even if First Amendment doctrine permits the inclusionary approach, we 
can still consider the question whether First Amendment values might militate against judicial 
reliance on that approach. 
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considered.  The relevant question, after all, is not whether a reduction in 
political candidates’ expressive freedom represents a free speech-related cost; 
rather, it is whether those costs are significant enough to outweigh whatever 
constitutional benefits that the inclusionary approach would confer.  
Consider, for instance, the possibility that a candidate, fearing future 
constitutional troubles, declines to defend a policy proposal by reference to a 
harmful racial stereotype.  From a purely “free speech”-focused perspective, 
the candidate’s self-censorship represents a constitutional “loss”: the 
candidate would have expressed himself more freely but for the courts’ 
willingness to consider campaign communications as evidence of improper 
motive.  But from an equal protection perspective, the candidate’s self-
censorship represents a plausible constitutional “gain.”  The candidate has 
declined to validate a set of constitutionally-suspect motives and beliefs and, 
thus by extension, has helped to minimize future public suspicions that those 
motives and beliefs are impermissibly influencing official government 
policy.98  Or consider, conversely, the possibility that a candidate, knowing 
full well that courts must ignore what he says while campaigning, openly 
espouses racist views and openly assures his supporters that he will, if elected, 
promote the ideology of white supremacy.  And suppose the candidate 
thereupon assumes office and begins implementing facially-neutral policies 
with racially discriminatory effects.  The campaign statements make it 
abundantly clear that the official is pursuing an intentionally discriminatory 
goal, but the strict evidentiary prohibition renders courts powerless to 
acknowledge that reality.  Here too, free-speech values and equal-protection 
values collide: The “benefit” of a robust and freewheeling campaign comes 
at the expense of racially discriminatory action that courts can do nothing 
about. 
How one reconciles these tradeoffs depends on the relative weights one 
places on free-speech values and the competing, constitutional values that 
motive-based requirements can bring into play.  Perhaps, as a matter of first 
principles, free-speech values are so much more important and so much 
more absolute that they must always take precedence across all doctrinal 
contexts.99  I cannot definitively refute that argument here,100 but there is an 
 
 98 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 600 (“To the extent that our review chills 
campaign promises to condemn and exclude entire religious groups, we think that a welcome 
restraint.”). 
 99 Even here, complications would arise insofar as a challenger pointed to campaign-communications 
to support a First Amendment claim, at which point, one set of free-speech values (say, the value of 
free, unfettered debate) would be pitted directly against another (say, the value of avoiding 
governmental action that appears to punish the espousal of unpopular beliefs). 
 100 For a more extended exploration into the means by which courts might attempt to gauge the 
relative “importance” of legal rights (including, but not limited to constitutional rights), see Michael 
Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 732–34 (2013). 
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important sense in which it ends up proving too much.  Motive-based rules—
even with campaign communications fully excluded from judicial purview—
will always produce caution and self-censorship on the part of individuals 
holding office.101  The “discriminatory intent” requirement of the Equal 
Protection Clause may affect what a governor says at a bill-signing ceremony; 
the motive-based elements of dormant Commerce Clause may affect what a 
state legislator says in a press release; the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test 
may affect what an administrator says in a television interview; and so forth.  
Again, from one perspective, this result might seem like a good thing: motive-
revealing rhetoric of this sort can be characterized as constitutionally bad 
and its minimization as constitutionally good.  But whether the result is good 
or bad, my point here is simply that the result obtains.  As long as motives 
matter in constitutional law, public officials will have reason to avoid 
injecting certain types of arguments and justifications into public debate.  
The chilling effects don’t just melt away when the campaign ends.102  
Consequently, if free-speech concerns turn out to be powerful enough to 
require an exclusionary approach to communications made during a 
campaign, they would also seem to require an exclusionary approach to any 
motive-revealing communications made at any time in any form.  As long as 
motives matter, aspiring and actual public officials will sometimes have to 
moderate what they say. 
B.  Effects on Governing 
A second objection to the inclusionary approach would point to 
consequences arising after the campaign has concluded.  If government 
officials have broadcast bad motives when campaigning for office, the 
inclusionary approach might sometimes help to demonstrate that suspect 
motives lurk beneath those officials’ subsequent actions.  And in so doing, the 
approach will increase the likelihood of those subsequent actions being struck 
down.  Where deferential review would normally apply, searching judicial 
review will instead apply—all because of what a public official said back when 
that official was running for office.  This would amount to, in some judges’ 
 
 101 See Somin, supra note 13 (“Any inquiry into the discriminatory motives of government officials might 
potentially chill their speech, because speech indicating a discriminatory motivation is inevitably 
going to be relevant evidence in such a case.”). 
 102 Indeed, a former candidate would now have even less reason to discount the risk of subsequent 
judicial invalidation.  The post-campaign risk of constitutional trouble would be higher because: (a) 
post-campaign statements will have a closer temporal proximity to the official governmental action; 
and (b) the candidate would now actually hold the office rather than simply have a chance of doing 
so.  In other words, what once was the risk that something said might eventually cause constitutional 
trouble in the event that the candidate won election would now become the (higher) risk that 
something said might more immediately cause constitutional trouble, period. 
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views, “an absurd result—namely, that the policies of an elected official can 
be forever held hostage by the unguarded declarations of a candidate.”103  
Call this the “constrained governance” concern; it stems from worries that a 
former candidate will have a hard time implementing government policy if 
courts can pay attention to what that candidate said in the past. 
There are two ways of interpreting the “constrained governance” 
complaint.  First, the complaint may simply state an equitable concern about 
the unfairness of “punishing” a former candidate for things that were said 
during a campaign.  If this is the relevant concern, then color me 
unsympathetic.  Campaign-cognizant motives analysis may well create a 
problem for former political candidates who now assume the burden of 
governing.  But if an official himself really did signal bad motives during the 
course of a campaign, the problem is one of the official’s own making.  To 
take the most obvious example, no one forced Donald Trump to demonize 
the world’s second-largest religious group when he sought the Presidency. 
Instead, Trump himself chose to make anti-Muslim sentiment a pillar of his 
campaign, calculating—quite possibly correctly—that doing so would 
redound to his political benefit.  But whatever the political expedience of this 
maneuver, it had the foreseeable consequence of casting now-President 
Trump’s immigration policy in a troubling constitutional light.  Pitying 
Trump and blaming the courts for that state of affairs seems to me to get 
things backwards.  Trump was the one that repeatedly defended his 
immigration priorities in religion-charged terms, and the courts were the 
ones who had to grapple with the constitutional difficulties that his own 
rhetoric created. 
But even if we set aside concerns about the fair treatment of candidate-
speakers, there is a separate version of the “constrained governance” 
complaint that we need to consider.  The concern here is that judicial 
scrutiny of campaign communications will sometimes result in the 
invalidation of laws that—from a purely consequentialist standpoint—really 
ought to be in place.  For example, counterterrorism needs may sometimes 
necessitate the adoption of rules that have a disparate impact on some 
Muslim-majority countries.  But if the President’s own campaign 
communications support an inference of anti-Muslim animus, then those 
 
 103 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 650–51 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (worrying that an 
inclusionary approach would “leave the President and his Administration in a clearly untenable 
position for future action” given that “President Trump will need to engage in foreign policy 
regarding majority-Muslim nations, including those designated by the Order”); Kontorovich, supra 
note 13 (“This would mean that Trump is automatically disbarred, from the moment of his 
inauguration, of exercising certain presidential powers, not because of his actions as president, but 
because of who he is—that is, how he won the presidency.”). 
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same policies will always be vulnerable to judicial invalidation, even where 
those policies have valid, security-promoting effects.  And one can imagine 
other variations on the theme.  A candidate’s past appeal to racial stereotypes 
might frustrate a state’s present-day ability to foster valuable student diversity 
at its educational institutions.104  A candidate’s past embrace of the goal of 
impeding access to abortions might frustrate a state’s ability to implement 
valid health and safety measures related to the licensing of abortion 
providers.105  A candidate’s expressed desire to silence an opposing viewpoint 
might frustrate the state’s ability to implement any number of sensible “time, 
place, manner” restrictions on speech.106  In short, the inclusionary approach 
could end up prohibiting former candidates from pursuing a variety of 
legitimate or even compelling regulatory ends.  
This objection states a valid concern, but the concern is over- and 
underinclusive in relation to the conclusion it prescribes.  As to the problem 
of underinclusiveness, the “constrained governance” objection, like the 
“chilling effects” objection, implicates all forms of government-motives 
analysis, not just campaign-cognizant motives analysis in particular.  Any 
area of doctrine that calls for a consideration of government motives gives 
rise to the possibility that certain statements or actions by government 
officials will render their policies vulnerable to judicial invalidation; that 
possibility becomes no less acute when the relevant statements and actions 
postdate an official’s elevation to office.  Indeed, taken to its logical extreme, 
the “constrained governance” objection simply collapses into a prescription 
for majoritarian judicial review.107  That prescription may or may not have 
 
 104 Of course, a race-conscious admissions program would already trigger strict scrutiny, so the motive-
revealing statements would have no effect on the level of scrutiny being applied.  See generally Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to a race-conscious admissions program).  
Even so, the revealed motives and/or beliefs might prompt a court to look more skeptically at the 
government’s justification for the program when applying the strict scrutiny standard.  See supra 
Section I.C.  
 105 Here, campaign communications might be used to show that the restriction served the “purpose” 
of creating a “substantial obstacle” to pre-viability abortions, even if it did not necessarily achieve 
that purpose in effect.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (“An 
undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 106 The campaign communication in this example might suffice to demonstrate that the speech-
infringing aspects of a law were in fact “related to the suppression of free expression,” in which case 
a “more demanding standard” of scrutiny would apply.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403–04 
(1989); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that, “in determining 
content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular,” the 
“government’s purpose is the controlling consideration”). 
 107 After all, and as I have suggested elsewhere, many constitutional constraints on government will have 
the effect of making it more difficult for governments to govern.  That is just a baseline feature of a 
system that involves judicially enforceable constitutional limits.  See Coenen, supra note 59, at 53–56.  
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merit, but it ought at least be stated as such.  
As to overinclusiveness, the “constrained governance” objection posits an 
unpersuasive case for a total abandonment of the field.  The objection may 
suffice to show why courts should never treat the badly-motivated nature of 
a law as a ground for automatic invalidation.  But it states a less persuasive 
case against merely raising the justificatory hurdle that badly-motivated 
actions must clear.  One can apply a strong judicial presumption against 
badly-motivated action while still permitting the government to act in the 
face of a sufficiently strong regulatory need.  That, indeed, is what many 
existing areas of doctrine purport to do,108 and it reflects one attempt to 
reconcile the real constitutional problems that bad motives create with the 
real-world demands that government actors must face.  The point, to be 
clear, is not that existing doctrine strikes precisely the right balance between 
these competing concerns, or even that striking the right balance is 
conceptually easy to do.109  Rather, the point is simply that the balance can 
at least be attempted: One does not need to “choose” between the polar 
extremes of caring exclusively about bad motives, on the one hand, and of 
deferring reflexively to the government, on the other.  Intermediate solutions 
can and do exist. 
What is more, even if an existing form of motive analysis might prevent 
the government from pursuing what it regards to be necessary regulatory 
action, the government can itself alter the backdrop against which this 
analysis proceeds.  This is especially true where the relevant motives are 
apparent rather than actual.  Social perceptions are fluid and malleable, and if 
the government wishes to “change the narrative” about a given law or policy, 
it certainly has the wherewithal to do so.  Some critics of the inclusionary 
approach have insisted that candidates who broadcast bad motives on the 
campaign will forever be “stuck” with those same bad motives going 
forward.110  But why should that be so?  There is nothing external to the 
President that prevents him from disavowing his previous “Muslim ban” and 
expressing regret at having previously appealed to anti-Islamic prejudices.  
And if such an about-face proves to be sufficiently public, enduring, and 
sincere, then the “social meaning” of the President’s immigration policy can 
in fact change and, along with it, the constitutional implications of the policy 
 
 108 See Fallon, supra note 67, at 1309–11 (explaining how some policies have survived strict scrutiny). 
 109 For example, Ashutosh Bhagwat has criticized the strict scrutiny test on the ground that its relatively 
“ad hoc” nature has “tended to weaken individual rights.”  Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the 
(D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 962 (1998).  
 110 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“If a 
court were to find that campaign skeletons prevented an official from pursuing otherwise 
constitutional policies, what could he do to cure the defect?  Could he stand up and recant it all 
(‘just kidding!’) and try again?”). 
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itself.111  
All of this may seem far-fetched,112 but I believe its underlying 
constitutional logic is sound.  Whenever constitutional law draws a 
distinction between badly-motivated and innocently-motivated government 
action, courts must make some inquiry into the reasons for which the 
government acted.  Those reasons can be evinced by a variety of different 
materials, including, but not limited to, statements that government officials 
issued while running for office.  But just as campaign communications can 
showcase bad motives, so too can post-campaign communications showcase 
innocent motives.  And the latter statements, if weighty enough, should alter 
the motive-based calculus, by revealing that government officials appear to 
endorse—or in fact do endorse—policies for reasons that are different from 
ones that they embraced during the campaign.  That the structure of this 
inquiry might sometimes induce government officials to “change their tune” 
strikes me as a feature rather than a bug of motive-sensitive doctrinal analysis.  
If we care about government motives (and especially about apparent 
government motives), rules that encourage officials openly to abandon 
wrongful purposes create exactly the set of incentives that the doctrine ought 
to strive for. 
C.  Effects on Judging 
A final, consequence-based objection to campaign-cognizant motives 
review points to disruptive effects within judicial doctrine itself.  The 
inclusionary approach, by definition, widens the evidentiary domain within 
which motives analysis proceeds.  The higher the number of statements and 
communications that courts can consider, the more unbounded the inquiry 
becomes.  That open-endedness, in turn, can render legal conclusions about 
motive more difficult to predict and easier to manipulate in the service of 
extralegal goals.  Viewed from this perspective, a bright-line, exclusionary 
approach to campaign communications may be seen as a welcome means of 
circumscribing a form of judicial analysis that might otherwise spin out of 
control. 
 
 111 Cf. Joseph Blocher, Out, Damned Spot: What Cure for Unconstitutional Animus?, TAKE CARE (May 31, 
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/out-damned-spot-what-cure-for-unconstitutional-animus 
(considering the problem of how courts might determine whether government statements suffice to 
“remove the taint” of an impermissible purpose, and suggesting that while “[i]t is not easy to 
articulate a single, trans-substantive test for curing unconstitutional intent. . . .  [D]escribing a cure 
is not radically different from that of diagnosis, which the Court has done in a variety of contexts”); 
see also Coenen, supra note 5, at 1769 (noting that “the potential for fruitful dialogue [is] driven by 
motive-based rules”). 
 112 I concede that it is far-fetched to imagine President Trump disavowing his previous statements 
about Islam, but that is an altogether separate issue. 
 
374 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:2 
In endorsing an exclusionary approach, one lower court judge recently 
gave voice to this very concern: 
[C]ampaign statements are unbounded resources by which to find intent of 
various kinds.  They are often short-hand for larger ideas; they are explained, 
modified, retracted, and amplified as they are repeated and as new 
circumstances and arguments arise.  And they are often ambiguous.  A court 
applying the majority’s new rule could thus have free rei[n] to select 
whichever expression of a candidate’s developing ideas best supports its 
desired conclusion.113 
The concern, moreover, goes beyond the problem of doctrinal uncertainty. 
Left free to rummage through campaign materials, the argument goes, 
judges will start to develop even bolder ideas: “If a court, dredging through 
the myriad remarks of a campaign, fails to find material to produce the 
desired outcome, what stops it from probing deeper to find statements from 
a previous campaign, or from a previous business conference, or from 
college?”114  The exclusionary approach, so the argument goes, would stop 
such shenanigans dead in their tracks.115 
Like any objection grounded in concerns about open-endedness and 
unpredictability, this argument implicates the familiar “rules/standards” 
tradeoff.  All else equal, the exclusionary approach (which regards campaign 
communications as categorically irrelevant) prescribes a form of motives 
analysis that is more rule-like than the inclusionary approach (which regards 
campaign communications as potentially relevant).116  The former, unlike the 
latter, places a large body of potentially probative evidence out of bounds, 
thus obviating the need to make difficult judgment calls about the meaning 
of certain statements, their connection to a challenged law, the comparative 
weight to accord them, and so forth.  But, as is often true with bright-line 
rules, the gains in simplicity and straightforwardness come at the expense of 
 
 113 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 114 Id.; see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1173 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“And why stop with the 
campaign?  Personal histories, public and private, can become a scavenger hunt for statements that 
a clever lawyer can characterize as proof of a -phobia or an -ism, with the prefix depending on the 
constitutional challenge of the day.”). 
 115 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Limiting the evidentiary 
universe to activities undertaken while crafting an official policy makes for a manageable, sensible 
inquiry.  But the panel has approved open season on anything a politician or his staff may have 
said, so long as a lawyer can argue with a straight face that it signals an unsavory motive.”). 
 116 It is perhaps worth noting that the inclusionary approach may in some cases simplify the judicial 
inquiry.  Suppose, in particular, that the relevant “official” proclamations, statements, etc., are 
ambiguous as to the existence of a suspect motive, and suppose further that the relevant campaign-
related communications are relentlessly and unambiguously revealing of that suspect motive.  In 
this scenario, the exclusionary approach leaves judges charged with the difficult task of parsing and 
interpreting the ambiguous official statements, whereas the inclusionary approach makes it easy for 
judges to resolve the ambiguities.  Sometimes, in other words, broadening the evidentiary pool will 
have the beneficial effect of generating clarity where confusion would otherwise have prevailed. 
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accuracy, nuance, and context-sensitivity.117  And that is so because, as I have 
already argued, campaign communications can sometimes provide useful, 
relevant information about the government’s reasons for acting.  How one 
responds to this tradeoff depends in part on one’s relative affinities towards 
rules and standards.  But in my view, the simplicity-related benefits of the 
exclusionary approach are not significant enough to justify its accuracy-
related costs. 
Three observations might bolster this conclusion, even for those who 
place a higher premium on the value of bright-line rules.  First, under some 
circumstances, the inclusionary approach will actually prove more clarity-
enhancing than its exclusionary counterpart.  Where the record reveals little 
information (or mixed information) about post-election government motives, 
the exclusionary approach will present a difficult, motive-related inquiry.  
But where pre-election communications make the motive abundantly clear, 
the inclusionary approach will greatly simplify the inquiry.  An expanded 
universe of relevant evidence, in other words, does not always yield a more 
complex and indeterminate evidentiary inquiry.  Where the evidentiary 
universe is expanded to encompass highly probative information, what was 
once a difficult and unbounded investigation into government motive will 
become simple and straightforward instead.  
Second, and relatedly, an exclusionary approach to campaign 
communications may not provide as much of a bright-line sorting 
mechanism as first meets the eye.  Under some circumstances, the distinction 
between “campaign-related” and “campaign-unrelated” communications 
may turn out to be straightforward, but in other circumstances, one can 
imagine various threshold difficulties raised by the distinction itself.  This 
seems especially so with respect to incumbents running for re-election—
officials, that is, who are simultaneously campaigning and governing during 
the same time period.  When it comes to these officials, what sorts of 
statements should the exclusionary approach exclude?  Certainly statements 
made at campaign rallies and fundraisers.  But what about statements made 
at a press conference before the rally?  Statements uttered during a cable 
news interview?  Statements posted to the individual’s unofficial (and/or 
official) Twitter feed?  Statements made at “official” events that had an 
evident, campaign-related purpose?  Given the frequent blending of 
governing and politicking, incumbents’ actions will sometimes be difficult to 
place on one side or the other of the “campaign-related” line.  Under an 
inclusionary approach, however, this particular difficulty goes away; the 
absence of a threshold bar on campaign-communications obviates the need 
to tag such communications as campaign-related or campaign-unrelated in 
the first place. 
 
 117 See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 644, 652 n.19 (2014). 
376 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:2 
Finally, the simplicity-based critique of the inclusionary approach likely 
understates the potential for subsequent clarifying guidance.  Open-
standards can be “rulified” over time,118 and it is easy to imagine the 
emergence of various rule-like restrictions on the application of campaign-
cognizant motives review.  For example, the doctrine might prohibit reliance 
on statements by surrogates, thus restricting the evidentiary domain to only 
those words that were uttered by candidates themselves.  The doctrine might 
impose temporal restrictions on the use of campaign communications, 
permitting reliance, for instance, on only those statements and 
communications that were uttered during the candidate’s most recent run 
for office.  The doctrine might develop a more nuanced set of rules regarding 
the strength of the connection between motive-revealing communications and the 
policies that they might inform—requiring, for instance, that an actual 
government policy constitute a “direct outgrowth” of a campaign proposal 
that was defended in constitutionally suspect terms.119  I raise these 
possibilities not for the purpose of endorsing them; some may be undesirable 
on their own terms and others may not provide much in the way of 
constraining “rulification.”  But they at least serve to highlight the possibility 
of citing to campaign communications within a framework that is at least 
somewhat structured and constraining.  
One final point bears mentioning here, as applied to the particular 
concern about judicial manipulation and abuse.  At the margins, it may be 
true that the inclusionary approach gives judges more leeway to manipulate 
doctrine than does its exclusionary counterpart.  But I doubt the difference 
is great.  Judging governmental purpose is an inherently discretionary 
endeavor, requiring difficult (and to some extent ineffable) judgments 
involving abstractions like “intentions,” “mental states,” “social meanings,” 
and so forth.120  The abstractness of the concepts themselves will always 
create room for opportunistic and manipulative judging; that risk, I think, is 
simply baked in to the business of considering government motives in the first 
place.  Motive-based rules are in this sense no different from any number of 
other rules within constitutional law that create openings for bad-faith 
 
 118 See id. at 653–58; see also Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 
696 (2005) (noting that open-ended standards “almost always become[ ] increasingly rule-like” as 
they are applied over time). 
 119 Cf. Somin, supra note 13 (emphasizing that President Trump’s travel plan was a “direct outgrowth 
of a major theme” of his campaign).  
 120 And that is to say nothing of any number of other tasks that judges routinely take on, such as 
defining the relevant “field” that a law regulates for purposes of preemption analysis, asking whether 
a particular government interest qualifies as “compelling” for purposes of applying strict scrutiny, 
or consulting historical sources (including, not incidentally, the campaign-centered Federalist 
Papers) in an effort to discern the “original public meaning” of the Constitution’s text.  See Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 
1288 (2006) (“No one doubts . . . that constitutional law makes frequent use of standards, often 
without anguish concerning their judicial manageability.”).  
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mischief-making by the judges who apply them.  They are there, and they 
can be abused.  But if we are willing to tolerate that risk when it comes to 
evaluating government motives in the first place, then it seems to me that we 
should be equally willing to tolerate the risk when it comes to defining the 
evidentiary parameters of the inquiry.  In both cases, the better guard against 
abusive judicial conduct lies in the maintenance of professional standards 
that promote honesty, impartiality, and good-faith behavior within the 
judiciary itself—not in constructing largely arbitrary prophylactic rules 
governing the sorts of evidence on which judges can and cannot rely.  
CONCLUSION 
The appeal of the exclusionary approach may stem from the commonly 
shared idea that judging is—or at least ought to be—an apolitical exercise.  
If we are serious about maintaining a wall between law and politics, the 
argument goes, then we should eschew the inclusionary approach on the 
ground that, by intermingling electoral politics with constitutional law, it 
threatens to breach the divide.  But it is also worth remembering that too much 
separation between law and politics may itself be a bad thing, threatening to 
render the doctrine unduly artificial, naïve, and unresponsive to peoples’ 
lived experiences in the real world.  Judges can undoubtedly simplify and de-
politicize the doctrine by refusing to consider anything and everything 
“politics-related” when deciding constitutional cases.  But at some point they 
would be operating against the backdrop of an informational universe that 
bears little resemblance to the one we actually inhabit.  Some recognition of 
political realities may therefore be necessary in order to ensure that 
constitutional guarantees remain meaningful. 
Of course, it is difficult to say where exactly judges should strike the 
balance between the twin extremes of total political agnosticism and total 
political awareness: Each extreme carries its own limitations and downside 
risks.  But as I hope to have shown, I believe that courts can reasonably 
navigate these risks when evaluating and weighing motive-related 
communications that are made during the course of a political campaign.  
And I further believe that the exclusionary approach—which would shut 
down any such investigation altogether—would end up distorting motive-
based review in unproductive ways.  That is not to say that courts should 
exclusively consider campaign-related communications when identifying the 
government’s reasons for acting; nor is it to say that the motive-revealing 
significance of a campaign communication ought always to outweigh 
anything that the government “officially” does.  But I do think that such 
communications can provide a useful piece of the evidentiary puzzle—one 
that can be utilized without unduly compromising future campaigns, present-
day governance, or the complexity of the doctrine at large.  If the path to 
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power runs through a political campaign, then courts ought to assess the 
exercise of that power with the campaign itself in view. 
 
